A New Citizen

Remembering a Dream, a Poem by Su Dongpo

2011-07-21T19:16:00.006+08:00

Upon reading my last post, a friend sent in her favorite Su Dongpo (苏東坡) poem with translation.

I'll take this opportunity to provide a simple primer on Su Dongpo. Born "Su Shi" (苏轼) in Meishan, Sichuan Province, Su became perhaps the most famous literati of the Song Dynasty. His brother Su Zhe (蘇轍) and his father Si Xun (蘇洵) were both famous as well. Su's early education was conducted by a Taoist priest and he married at the age of 17. At this young age he was a recognized master of the Confucian classics. In 1057, at 19, he and his brother passed the state civil service exams allowing them to attain high government office. Su held a many positions over the next 20 years, most notably as Governor of Xuzhou and for authorizing the building of a pedestrian bridge across the West Lake in Hangzhou.

Su fell out of favor when his political rival, a man named Wang Anshi, deftly portrayed Su's criticisms of him as criticisms of the Emperor. He began a life in exile in Hubei Province, where he became famous for poetry, literary criticism, devout meditation, and calligraphy. He lived on a plot of land called "Dongpo", or "Eastern Slope," from which he took his pseudonym. Su was rehabilitated in 1100 and posted to Chengdu, but died en route at the age of 64. About 2,700 of his poems survive.

This poem is a jiang1 cheng2zi (江城子), or, ci2 pai2 ming2, 词牌名, a poem that conforms to relatively strict composition rules, kind of like a Japanese haiku. In a 词 poem, the rules affect the rhythm and the tones at play in the verse. This poem is called "乙卯正月二十日夜記夢" -- Remembering a Dream -- and is written in memory of his first wife, Wang Fu (王弗) who died in 1065.

十年生死两茫茫，不思量，自难忘。

Shí nián shēngsǐ liǎng mángmáng, bù sīliang, zì nánwàng.
千里孤坟，无处话凄凉。

Qiānlǐ gū fén, wú chù huà qīliáng.
纵使相逢应不识，尘满面，鬓如霜。

Zòngshǐ xiāngféng yìng bù shí, chén mǎnmiàn, bìn rú shuāng.
夜来幽梦忽还乡，小轩窗，正梳妆。

Yèlái yōu mèng hū huán xiāng, xiǎo xuān chuāng, zhèng shūzhuāng.
相顾无言，惟有泪千行。

Xiānggù wú yán, wéiyǒu lèi qiān háng.

料得年年肠断处，明月夜，短松冈。

Liào de nián nián chángduàn chù, míngyuè yè, duǎn sōng gāng.

It means:

Ten years, dead and living dimly, drawn apart.
I don't try to remember,
But forgetting is hard.
　Lonely grave a thousand miles off,
　Cold thoughts, where can I speak them aloud?
　Even if we met, you wouldn't recognize me any more,
　Dust on my face,
　Hair like frost.
　In a dream last night suddenly I was home.
　By the window of the little room,
　You were combing your hair and putting on makeup.
　You turned and looked at me, speechless,
　Only lines of tears coursing down your face.
　Year after year will it still break my heart?
　The moonlit night,
　The stubby pines.

Song Translation: 但愿人长久 (May We Be Blessed With Longevity)

2011-07-06T13:50:00.010+08:00

但愿人长久 (Dàn yuàn rén chángjiǔ) – May We Be Blessed With Longevity

I’m back, and have to mark this occasion in style. How about a new song? This is one of my favorites in any language. It’s simple and expressive with a hypnotic cadence, and a mix of Chinese/Western instruments. But, the magic is in the old and esoteric lyrics, not the orchestration. The lines are actually exactly those of a poem in the form of 水调歌头, named "明月几时有" (When was the Moon Created?) and written by Su Dongpo (蘇東坡, 1037 – 1101), a famed literati of the Song Dynasty. He wrote it on a mid-autumn day for his younger brother who was far away. He expressed the feeling of missing him during the Mid-Autumn Festival when the moon is full and families come together, yet this year the brothers were apart. Originally, it expressed missing your family, but today the meaning has been extended to express missing of your dear friends or your love, as well.

There’s a pretty commonly used translation by Lin Yutang (林语堂, 1895 – 1976), a Nobel Prize-nominated Chinese writer and inventor. I normally defer to such learned sources, but in this case the translation is liberal, and a friend of mine provided what I think is a more moving rendition. I have harmonized them somewhat to come up with this version below. It is likely flawed, but I hope not badly.

It was set to music somewhere along the way and reached broad audiences when taken up by the indomitable Deng Lijun. However, in another rare break, I strongly prefer the rendition of Wang Fei (王菲). Perhaps I think this song is better suited to her, as she has enjoyed a reputation for putting love before her own career advancement on multiple occasions.

明月几时有？
Míngyuè jǐshí yǒu?
When was the bright moon created?

把酒问青天，不知天上宫阙，今夕是何年。
Bǎjiǔ wèn qīngtiān, bùzhī tiānshàng gōngjué, jīnxī shì hé nián.
Raising a cup of wine, I ask the blue sky.
I don't know what day it is in heaven,
But I think it must be very beautiful.

我欲乘风归去，又恐琼楼玉宇，高处不胜寒。
Wǒ yù chéng fēng guī qù, yòu kǒng qióng lóu yùyǔ, gāo chù bùshèng hán.
How I wish I could fly to the jade mansion in the heavenly palace,
but I fear it is too cold and high for me to go.

起舞弄清影，何似在人间！
Qǐ wǔnòng qīng yǐng, hé shì zài rénjiān!
My shadow dancing in the moonlight, I no longer feel mortal.

转朱阁，低绮户，照无眠。
Zhuǎn zhū gé, dī qǐ hù, zhào wú mián.
The moon rounds the red mansion and stoops to silk-padded doors,
shining upon the restless.

不应有恨，何事长向别时圆！
Bù yìng yǒu hèn, héshì zhǎng xiàng bié shí yuán!
One shouldn't complain, but why is the moon so full when people are apart?!

人有悲欢离合，月有阴晴圆缺，此事古难全。
Rén yǒu bēihuānlíhé, yuè yǒu yīn qíng yuán quē, cǐ shì gǔ nán quán.
People may have sorrow or joy, be near or far apart;
The moon may wax or wane;
This has been going on since the beginning of time.

但愿人长久，千里共婵娟
Dàn yuàn rén chángjiǔ, qiānlǐ gòng chánjuān.
May we all be blessed with longevity.
Though far apart, we are still able to share the beauty of the moon together
if we miss each other deeply.

Farewell, My Intercambio.

2010-06-09T23:43:00.000+08:00

Being stateside, I haven’t had many relevant activities to post here this year. My Rotary-China experience hasn’t come in very handy except for presentations to Rotary clubs, or side-discussions on international policy or Amy Tan novels with the judges and staff at the Courthouse. To anyone who has inquired about my whereabouts or taciturn-turn, thank you.

There have been a few adoptions of Chinese children, some where the parents go to China to retrieve the child (from Guangzhou or Shanghai), and a couple of stateside airport pickups through an agency. Korean adoptions are far more prevalent. Once, I encountered an aged Caucasian couple roaming the hallways with a mid-30’ish Chinese woman from Guangzhou. Despite their ages and the fact that she hardly spoke any English (nor they any Chinese) they were intent on adopting her. The elders were extremely frustrated by Maryland adoption bureaucracy and the male snarkled, “We have to do things according to the law here, unlike in China.” Bound by my oath for this year I was unable to provide any legal assistance, other than to suggest to both parties – in their respective languages – that they find an adoption attorney.

I occasionally hold court at the City Buffet restaurant, in my opinion this burgh’s finest. I bargained for a permanent 15% discount from the manager’s wife in exchange for introducing new guests. A few have actually returned on their own, justifying my end of the bargain. When I was first transitioning back it provided a comfortable oasis, although your standard American-Chinese restaurants don’t serve many real Chinese staple foods. Oh, for a bowl of zhou – fish congee – in the morning. (One notable exception: Chicago’s Chinatown).

Anyway, I had a good thing going with a waitress at the City Buffet. She was studying English in a classroom at a local high school from 7-9:30pm on Tuesdays and Thursdays. I would meet her after work from 5-7 on those nights, and we’d exchange one hour of Chinese instruction for one hour of English, and then I’d drive her to class on my way out of town. It was a serendipitous format that lasted from February to early May, 2010.

Unfortunately, my intercambio has moved on. About two weeks ago her best friend/co-worker at the restaurant was slapped by another waitress. Unaware of other procedures to handle such emergent circumstances the victim resorted to her knowledge of American TV and movies, and dialed 9-1-1. Within minutes the city police descended on the restaurant, but not before the majority of the wait-staff had retreated to their apartment one block away. (The apartment, by the way, is owned by the manager of the restaurant, who docks their pay for rent).

By the time the police reached the apartment, most of the girls had loaded into a van and departed for Washington, DC, in order to catch the Chinatown bus to NYC. The victim and the perpetrator have never returned, seeking new employment there. My intercambio remained local, initially. She is insistent – no matter how I try to convince her of the extreme unlikely-hood – that it was the FBI at her apartment. In any event, after training the new wait-staff (which arrived within 48 hours), she decided to go to NYC and be reunited with her friend, as well as enjoy a more fast-paced environment.

In truth, I don’t think we learned all that much from each other linguistically. Our time was short. I was far more successful in gleaning a little information about the inner-workings of an American-Chinese restaurant. Most of the employees tend to be from Fujian, as the city of Fuzhou hosts massive employment agencies for this purpose. The managers were from Shanghai, but the waiters/waitresses were all from Fujian. Most of them, although speaking very decent English, do not have the benefit of a high school education back in China. They arrive in NYC, where the stateside branch of the employment agency places them. According to my intercambio, if they are in an unhappy environment at their placement, they are free to leave and seek employment at another restaurant in the USA. I was happy to hear that. Although I never asked, I suspect it is doubtful that many have the appropriate visas to be considered legal.

Of course, this story was only about one waitress at one Chinese restaurant in one American town. A microcosm perhaps not, but a vignette for sure. I will miss my intercambio.

Song Translation: 夢里水鄉 Meng Li Shui Xiang, The Water Village in my Dreams

2010-05-31T10:11:00.003+08:00

夢里水鄉, "Meng Li Shui Xiang," or
"The Water Village in my Dreams."

春天的黄昏
Chun (1) Tian (1) de Huang (2) Hun(1)
A Spring evening;

请你陪我到梦中的水乡
Qing (3) Ni (3) Pei (2) Wo(3) Dao (4) Meng (4) Zhong (1) de (1) Shui (3) Xiang(1)
Please accompany me to the water village in my dream.

让挥动的手在薄雾中飘荡
Rang(4) Hui (1) Dong (4) de(1) Shou(3)Zai (4) Bo(2) Wu(4) Zhong (1) Piao(1) Dang (4)
Waving hands floating in the light mist,

不要惊醒杨柳岸那些缠绵的往事
Bu (2) Yao(4) Jing(1) Xing(3) Yang(3) Liu(3) An(4) , Na(4) Xie (1) Chan(2) Mian (2) de (1) Wang(3) Shi(4)
Hope not to disturb the old love stories that happened around the riverbank,

化作一缕轻烟已消失在远方
Hua(4) Zuo(4) Yi(1) Lv(3) Qing(1) Yan(1) , Yi(3) Xiao(1) Shi (1) Zai(4) Yuan(3) Fang(1)
Which have disappeared in the distance like a light smoke.

暖暖的午后
Nuan Nuan de Wu Hou
A warm afternoon,

闪过一片片粉红的衣裳
Shan Guo Yi Pian Pian Fen Hong de Yi Shang
I see young girls in pink walking by.

谁也载不走那扇古老的窗
Shei Ye Zai Bu Zou, Na Shan Gu Lao de Chuang
No one can take away that ancient window,

玲珑少年在岸上守候一生的时光
Ling Long Shao Nian zai An Shang, Shou Hou Yi Sheng de Shi Guang
The young man waited for the love of his life on the riverbank,

为何没能做个你盼望的新娘
Wei He Mei Neng Zuo Ge Ni Pian Wang de Xin Niang
But the young lady can’t marry him.

淡淡相思都写在脸上
Dan Dan Xiang Si Dou Xie zai Lian Shang
Lovesickness written all over her face,

沉沉离别背在肩上
Chen Chen Li Bie Bei zai Jian Shang
The sorrow of separation seems like a heavy burden on her shoulder.

泪水流过脸庞
Lei Shui Liu Guo Lian Pang
Tears streamed down her face,

所有的话现在还是没有讲
Suo You de Hua, Xian Zai Hai Shi Mei You Jiang
All the words she wanted to tell him but hasn’t yet.

看那青山荡漾在水上
Kan Na Qing Shan Dang Yang zai Shui Shang
I see the green hills rippling on the clear water,

看那晚霞吻着夕阳
Kan Na Wan Xia Wen Zhe Xi Yang
I see the beautiful clouds at sunset,

我用一生的爱去寻找那一个家
Wo Yong Yi Sheng de Ai, Qu Xun Zhao Na Yi Ge Jia
I used the love of my whole life to find a place called “Home.”

今夜你在何方
Jin Ye Ni zai He Fang
Where are you tonight?

转回头迎着你的笑颜
Zhuan Hui Tou, Ying Zhe Ni de Xiao Yan
Turn around, I see you smiling,

心事全都被你发现
Xin Shi Quan Dou Bei Ni Fa Xian
You know all that I am thinking about, all that I am worried about,

梦里遥远的幸福它就在我的身旁
Meng Li Yao Yuan de Xing Fu, Ta Jiu zai Wo de Sheng Pang
Then, I finally realized, the happiness I have been dreaming about is here at my side.

Song Translation: "恰似你的温柔," or "Just Like Your Tenderness."

2010-01-26T12:11:00.002+08:00

This translation of the old standard "恰似你的温柔" (Qia4 Si4 Ni3 de1 Wen1 Rou2), or "Just Like Your Tenderness," submitted by 崔丽欣.

某年某月的某一天，

Mou Nian Mou Yue de Mou Yi Tian,

Some day, some month, some year;
就象一张破碎的脸。

Jiu Xiang Yi Zhang Po Sui De Lian,

Like a face I can’t remember,
难以开口道再见，

Nan yi kai kou dao zai jian,

It is hard for us to say goodbye,
就让一切走远。

Jiu rang yi qie zou yuan,

Let it be gone.
这不是一件容易的事，

Zhe bu shi yi jian rong yi de shi

This is not easy,
我们却都没有哭泣。

Wo men que dou mei you ku qi,

But we did not cry.
让它淡淡地来，

Rang Ta dan dan de lai,

Let it come subtly,
让它好好地去。

Rang ra hao hao de qu,

Let it be the past.
到如今年复一年，

Dao ru jin nian fu yi nian,

Now years have past,
我不能停止怀念。

Wo bu neng ting zhi huai nian,

I can’t stop thinking
怀念你，怀念从前。

Huai Nian ni, Huai nian cong qian

Thinking about you, thinking about the past,
但愿那海风再起，

Dan yuan na hai feng zai qi,

May the sea breeze comes again,
只为那浪花的手，

Zhi wei na lang hua de shou,

Just for the spray,
恰似你的温柔。

Qia Si Ni de Wen Rou.

Like your tenderness.

The Yijing and Chinese Statecraft continued: HEXAGRAM #50: THE CAULDRON, (DING, 鼎)

2010-01-11T13:01:00.001+08:00

HEXAGRAM #50: THE CAULDRON, (DING, 鼎)

Wilhelm and Kerson Huang literally translate ding (鼎, dǐng) as “Cauldron,” and Blofeld as “Sacrificial Vessel,” while Alfred Huang prefers its symbolic meaning, “Establishing the New.” Ding are ancient Chinese sacrificial vessels cast in bronze with two loop handles, three legs and a round bowl. Used primarily during the Xia, Shang and Zhou dynasties for serving food to honored dignitaries, ding have been intimately related to the ritual elements of Chinese statescraft. Not only is the ding hexagram the inverse of its predecessor, but it is unique among the hexagrams because it is meant to look like the very item it represents.

According to legend the founder of the Xia dynasty, Xia Yu, cast nine ding, symbolizing the nine conquered territories comprising his empire. The nine ding followed the ruler, and thus indicated where the capital was located: Emperor Tang moved them to Shang, the capital of the Shang dynasty; King Wu moved them to Lo, the capital of the Zhou dynasty. Early ding were often decorated with sacred inscriptions and pictures of animals, but once the ritual stately function was firmly realized later ding came to have actual laws inscribed upon them:

"Whenever a new dynasty began or a new emperor was enthroned, the first thing done was to cast a new ding and inscribe the new constitution on it, symbolizing that a new era had begun. The emperor employed the ding to prepare sacrificial offerings for the Lord of Heaven and to nourish persons of wisdom and virtue. For this reason, the Chinese scholars call the change of a dynasty “ding ge,” a phrase derived from the [Yijing]."

Thus, this hexagram has been interpretted as representing the importance of nourishing and honoring wise, virtuous and worthy individuals for the benefit of a new regime. It also represents transformation, but whereas its predecessor focuses on the bloody and destructive process of tearing down the old, the ding addresses the post-revolutionary phase of constructing a better social order. The acts of destroying the old, unjust regime and establishing and maintaining the new social order both require exceptionally qualified personnel. This hexagram suggests that the proper way to do so is to respect and rely upon wise and virtuous persons while eliminating those who are insincere or unqualified. It is an optimistic image, with the Judgment promising “Supreme Good Fortune. Success.”

Understanding the inherent imagery of hexagram #50 is a bit challenging, as three meanings are assigned to the two trigrams, but the image is mutually reinforcing. Its lower trigram is ☴ (巽, xùn), linked to wind (風, feng) under Fu Xi’s assignment of eight natural phenonemon to the trigrams, but thereafter also associated with wood (木, mu) under Taoist Five-Elements Theory. The upper trigram, ☲ (離, lí), is somewhat easier to comprehend, because it is associated with fire (火, huo) under both explications. Together they represent a flame kindled by wood and wind as in cooking: the wood and wind below nourishing the fire above. It is thus a symbol of harmonious cooperation among the natural elements.

Applied metaphorically to political affairs, it stands for stableness and reform. The Confucian Commentaries say:

"Fire over wood is the image not of the [ding] itself but of its use. Fire burns continuously when wood is under it. Life must also be kept alight, in order to remain so conditioned that the sources of life are perpetually renewed. Obviously the same is true of the life of a community or of a state. Here too relationships and positions must be so regulated that the resulting order has duration. In this way the decree of fate whereby rulership falls to a particular house becomes established."

The hexagram’s strongest lines are the six in the fifth place and the nine at the top, but we will address the image from the bottom to the top in keeping with the traditional Duke of Zhou interpretation. The first line is translated “a [ding] with legs upturned, furthers removal of stagnating stuff, one takes a concubine for the sake of her son, no blame.” This can have two metaphorical meanings. First, “if a [ding] is turned upside down before being used, no harm is done – on the contrary, this clears it of refuse.” Thus, the bottom line represents the beginning of a new order, the overturning indicating that a firm decision has been made to purge the old order thouroughly. Second, though a concubine’s position is lowly, she is honored for bearing a son. This expresses the idea that everyone can succeed in a highly developed civilzation regardless of class, provided he is ready to purify him or herself.

The second, third and forth lines discuss the political science involved in constructing a new state. Huang’s interpretation of the second line signifies a sense of fulfillment at the victory of the revolution, but warns that the envious and vain have no place in the new order. The third line furthers the explication of insidious corruption. In it, the ding’s handles have been damaged, rendering it useless. In the fourth line of the hexagram the ding’s legs break, spilling the dignitary’s food and bringing disaster. Huang’s explanations warn that disaster is risked if important work is assigned to unqualified people during the crucial post-revolution transition period. On the contrary, transitioning the proper personnel into their ideal roles, like proverbial rainfall, will bring prosperity. Thus, these three lines suggest the challenge and the urgent need to properly redistribute human and material resources at the beginning of a new regime.

The fifth and sixth lines promise that once that mission is effectively accomplished, peace and stability will flow to the new order. In the fifth line “[t]he [ding] has yellow handles, golden carrying rings. Perseverance furthers.” This indicates that the proper experts are in their proper roles. Wilhelm explains, “[a ruler] succeeds in finding strong and able helpers who complement and aid him in his work,” and Huang agrees that, “[t]his line tells us that King Wen obtained the support of persons with wisdom and virtue.” The sixth line – the one which represents the ring for carrying the ding -- assures the reader that, although vigilence must always be maintained, a favorable state has been achieved. “The ding has rings of jade, great good fortune, nothing that would not act to further.” In these lines valuable gold and precious jade -- notable for its combination of hardness with soft luster, both firm and gentle – comprise the ding. The line is also a yang element at a yin place, simultaneously firm and gentle like jade, and these are the qualities attributed to a benevolent king. Thus, this line represents a ruler of high wisdom and distinguished virtue, in the legendary image of King Wen.

Indeed, the image of the ding transcends the augur and claims an important place in Chinese etymology. The term “定鼎,” (ding ding) originated in the Zhou Dynasty, meaning “to found a country.” An idiom stemming from Yijing, “革故鼎新” (ge gu ding xin) means to discard old ways of life in favor of the new. It is also used in the expression, “三足鼎立,” (san zuo ding X) referencing the legendary Three Kingdoms period in Chinese history. This represents the counterbalance of three well-matched forces, alternating in confrontation and cooperation, none with an obvious advantage over any other. The vessel (or the world order) can not stand if one of the legs (countries, institutions) does not exist. Thus, their combination signifies holding, or harmony: a society in a stable state. Thus, the present hexagram refers to the cultural superstructure of society. This resilient image remains vibrant today, both ideologically and physically: in 1995, the Chinese Government presented a huge bronze ding to the United Nations to celebrate its 50th Anniversary.

Chinese Political Life and the Yijing

2009-12-28T16:05:00.001+08:00

>The Yijing (I Ching, 易经) is a textual compilation of ancient Chinese divination practices rich in poetic verse and historical tales.[1] It commands immense importance in Chinese culture, often equated to that of the West’s biblical tradition.[2] The last of at least three such texts – the Yi of the Xia Dynasty, the Yi of the Shang Dynasty, and the Yi of the Zhou Dynasty – it is, unfortunately, the only one to survive into modernity.[3] The essential knowledge it contains is so vast that it has been reinterpreted time and again by generations of scholars and statesmen applying it to their own times. The Yijing has been the subject of voluminous exegeses, often serving as the fountainhead of Chinese philosophical and political thought.[4] Over the millennia it has been worshipped by the ancients, commandeered by the Confucians, amended by the Taoists, tolerated by the Legalists, and now – perhaps – embraced by the Communists.

A. DIVINATION IN CHINESE STATESCRAFT

Primitive divination practices comprised the core of the original Yijing. Divination long had an important role in official Chinese life, evinced back to the famous Shang Dynasty oracle bones. The Shang Court (which ruled the Yellow River Valley from about 1850 to 1100 B.C.E.)[5] maintained colleges of official soothsayers to guide state matters.[6] Their principle method of auguring was to apply heat to one of six depressions carved into the ventral side of a turtle shell, causing cracks to appear.[7] The pattern of the cracks would be interpreted and judgment rendered.[8] Archaic as this practice may seem to the modern political scientist, it is not without obvious parallel to the practice of examining animal entrails once relied upon in Europe.[9] Fortunately for posterity, the Shang soothsayers inscribed their prognostications onto the fronts of the turtle shells, providing a lasting testament.[10] In 1936 an expedition sponsored by the Chinese Academy of Science uncovered an archive of over 100,000 such “oracle bones” at Anyang (安阳), the final capital of the Shang Dynasty.[11] The archives constitute an invaluable historical record of the Shang, [12] and those records impart to the shells their close link to all aspects of political life:

Divination had a bearing on all the activities of connected with the royal function: worship of ancestors and divinities, military expeditions, appointments to official posts, summonses to court, construction of towns, agricultural campaigns, meteorology, (rain, drought and winds), illnesses, journeys, dreams, births and the propitious or unpropitious nature of the decade or night to come.[13]

The aforementioned tortoise shells, as well as various matrixes of numerology,[14] comprised the

earliest Yijing.

B. THE YIN, THE YANG, AND THE YIJING

The Yijing is also built upon an ancient philosophy asserting that all things are locked into a continuous cycle, “rising and falling in a process of progressive evolutionary advancement. When situations meet their extremes, they alternate to their opposites.”[15] This is, of course, the basic philosophy of Yin and Yang. According to legend, an early Emperor-sage named Fuxi advanced the theory that any sequence of events can be described by these two basic elements.[16] Yin represents the characteristics of passivity and nurturing, while Yang is active, dominating and creative.[17] When Yang dominates for too long it wanes into an ascendant Yin force, and visa-versa. This eternal cycle offers hope in despair and cautions humility at the pinnacle of success.[18] Its essence, in a word, is “change.” Indeed, “Yijing” is translated to “Book of Change.”

In ancient notation, Yin is represented by a broken line, and Yang by a solid bar:[19]

___ ___ _______

YIN YANG

Fuxi pieced the Yin and Yang lines together by stacking them vertically into groups of three, creating trigrams.[20] Arranged in all possible combinations, eight trigrams were created to represent the basic elements of the known universe as then understood: Heaven, Earth, Thunder, Water, Mountain, Wind, Fire and Lake.[21]

_______ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ _______ _______ _______ ___ ___

_______ ___ ___ ___ ___ _______ ___ ___ _______ ___ ___ _______

_______ ___ ___ _______ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ _______ _______

HEAVEN EARTH THUNDER WATER MOUNTAIN WIND FIRE LAKE

Much later, King Wen of Zhou stacked these trigrams on top of each other in all possible combinations – thereby multiplying eight by eight – creating a total of 64 nuanced hexagrams.[22] Those 64 combinations, in keeping with the duality of Yin and Yang theory, can be subdivided into 32 conjugate-pairs in which one of the hexagrams can be obtained by standing its partner upside down (except for the eight hexagrams made by doubling like trigrams).[23] For example, take the 23^rd and 24^th hexagrams, which symbolize “LOSS-RETURN:”

_______ ___ ___

___ ___ ___ ___

___ ___ _______

(23) LOSS (24) RETURN

Each hexagram follows the development of an idea or situation, from its inception in the first line (at the bottom) to its ultimate fate in the last line (at the top). The first line sets the general mood, while successive lines describe the unfolding of the situation: six stages of change.[24] The final line warns of the consequences for overstepping proper bounds. In the example above, LOSS (23), the last line depicts a lonely Yang in its final stage of development, atop of a stack of ascendant Yin. This character has been interpreted to symbolize the end of a political or dynastic regime, hence “loss.”[25] Its partner, RETURN (24), describes the opposite situation, the rise of a new epoch. “[A] youthful Yang begins to sprout from the roots, ready to extend its influence upward to turn the Yin lines into vigorous Yangs. It symbolizes renewal, hence ‘return.’”[26] Thus, each conjugate pairing contains a complete set of alternating energies.

Furthermore, the entire canon of 64 hexagrams can be split in half at the 32^nd conjugate pair, where the first 32 pairs (or Upper Canon) represents the functions of Heaven; and the second half (or Lower Canon) represents the functions of humanity.[27] For instance, the first pair of hexagrams represent “HEAVEN-EARTH,” and the final pair “FULFILMENT-UNFULFILMENT.”[28] Whereas the folklore surrounding the “HEAVEN-EARTH” couplet clearly speaks to issues of divinity, the “FULFILMENT-UNFULFILMENT” couplet concerns human issues. That final couplet has long been interpreted as lamenting that the noble missions of the Shang and Zhou Dynasties were not completed.[29] Thus, the 64 hexagrams define existence as a totality of opposing and complimentary forces and virtues.

C. THE YIJING AND CHINESE STATECRAFT

To forecast with the Yijing, one casts a hexagram by educing six lines at random and interpreting that result through analogy to great political events in Chinese history. The original method for obtaining the lines was quite burdensome, involving the manipulation of 50 straws of yarrow reed,[30] but this practice was replaced by a more convenient method whereby three coins were tossed and hexagrams built upon the combinations of heads and tails during the Tang Dynasty.[31]

Once the hexagram is derived, all that remains is to properly interpret it in light of historical deeds, present circumstances and future potential. A vast compilation of literature accumulated over the millennia to provide such guidance, of which the most ancient meanings are largely suppressed or forgotten.[32] What is left of the earliest texts contain extremely concise language that is difficult to interpret into modernity.[33] Thus, the Yijing’s various interpreters drew from the progressing march of history to fill these gaps, creating a rich repository of folklore to draw from. Each hexagram now stands as an independent, epic poem chock full historical citations. These references render the great personalities and events of the past into a paradigm for modern analysis.

The earliest known historical event recorded in the Yijing was the Great Yellow River Flood of 2200 BC. The flood caused twelve years of catastrophic devastation until a legendary civil servant named Yu heroically brought it under control. To reward his years of selfless dedication, the reigning Emperor ceded the throne to Yu. [34] His ascension began the legendary Xia Dynasty (2197 to 1766 B.C.E.), the first hereditary dynasty in China.[35] Yet, by no means should Yu’s selflessness be misconstrued as probity; years later Yu would prove his mastery of Machiavellian statecraft by using mere tardiness as pretext to execute an insubordinate chieftain:

The rebellious cometh.

Last to arrive, he meets his end. (8 – SUPPORT)[36]

Another important political episode occurred during the Middle Xia Dynasty (circa 2120 B.C.E.) when Yoxiung, a master archer, usurped the throne and forced King Xiang into exile.[37] Yoxiung, in turn, was murdered by his aide, Hanju, who ascended to both the throne and to Yoxiung’s widow. [38] She bore Hanju two sons, and in time he sent one of them to kill the original King Xiang in his exile. Xiang’s wife escaped the attack and gave birth to Shao Kang (Kang the Younger). And, after 20 tumultuous, adventure-filled years, Hanju was overthrown and Shao Kang regained the dynasty that was his by blood.[39] These events inspired the poem accompanying the 38^th hexagram, “ABANDONMENT:”

The abandonment of a waif saw a pig in the mud,

And a cart full of demons.

He arched his bow at first,

But finally put it down.

They are not robbers, only wife grabbers.

Going would be favorable if it rains.

The Xia Dynasty ended in 1783 BC when, according to legend, its evil Emperor was toppled by the righteous Lord Tang. This began the Shang Dynasty (1766 to 1100 B.C.) a particularly important era for the Yijing, to which it often refers as the “Great Kingdom.”[40] The Shang saw new heights of culture and commerce, refining Chinese calligraphy and perfecting the techniques of bronze casting used to make a variety of novel items including austere cooking vessels.[41] The Shang capital was located in the Yellow River basin, and had to be moved eight times due to flooding throughout the epoch. These circumstances forged a special relationship between the Shang and its neighbor state, Zhou:

Water laps at the King’s house.

It’s safe.

On the road, the Duke got the news, agreed,

And assisted in moving the Capital. (42 – INCREASE)

The poem records how the vassal state of Zhou helped mighty Shang relocate its capital to Anyang in 1388 BC.[42] The same hexagram also implies that by ostensibly gaining Shang’s trust, Zhou laid the foundation for its ultimate overthrow of Shang.[43]

Those tumultuous events began in 1151 BC when Jou the Terrible, the final Shang emperor, ascended the throne. Jou was a Chinese Caligula, an infamous psychopath with a short temper and penchant for alcohol fueled orgies. Meanwhile, Zhou’s King Wen had earned a reputation as a humane ruler and impartial arbiter of disputes across the land. So revered is he that the Yijing twice records how Jou’s father, the Emperor Yi, gave his daughter in marriage to King Wen (although she was clearly upstaged in his heart by her niece/consort):

Emperor Yi betrothed his daughter.

With her niece as consort. (11 – PEACE)

Emperor Yi gave his daughter in marriage.

The princess is not as beautiful as her consort. (54 – THE MARRYING MAIDEN)

Jou became so jealous of Wen’s influence that he imprisoned him for seven years. It was during this incarceration that Wen reflected upon the Yin and Yang, as well as the trigrams, and bore the idea of stacking the trigrams to create hexagrams.[44] Wen also authored an introductory text to each hexagram called the “Judgment” to represent its general idea.[45] He recorded these ideas into a text called the Guazi which forms the skeleton of the modern Yijing.[46] So rich is this guide in political theory that some sources have claimed that King Wen’s original intent was to author a guide to statecraft, but that as a political prisoner he had to maintain the pretext of oracular folklore to conceal his work’s true nature.[47]

King Wen was eventually released through a tribute of fantastic bribes, an event also enshrined in the Yijing:

Imprisoned first, then set free,

The King makes offerings at West Mountain. (17 – THE CHASE)

This did not prevent King Wen’s son Taisi, destined to become King Wu, from avenging his father’s ordeal and overthrowing Jou.[48] Wu called for a revolution in 1122 BC when Jou was engrossed in a war against the barbarians of Huai.[49] Eight-hundred heads of state came forth with four thousand chariots to answer Wu’s call.[50] After delivering a historic speech on the field of Mu, Wu and his army marched forth determined to fulfill the mandate of heaven:[51]

On the day of the public gathering,

A new order is proclaimed. (49 – REVOLUTION).

Jou met the challenge with an army of 700,000, but most of the uninspired, conscripted soldiers

defected to King Wu:

None will rally,

Some will attack.

If there is no determination in the heart,

Disaster will befall. (42 - INCREASE).

Defeated, Jou retreated to an orgy ground, set himself ablaze, and burned to death. King Wu arrived and desecrated Jou’s body,[52] then declared himself Emperor and appointed his brother, Duke Zhou, as Prime Minister. The Yijing’s prophets rejoiced with their characteristic reticence:

Shang is vanquished.

Some things are possible. (2 – EARTH)

With Jou’s downfall the Shang Dynasty passed into the Zhou. Zhou would last eight centuries, an epoch that included the Golden Age of Chinese philosophy. Duke Zhou himself was a master of the Yijing, and he elevated King Wen’s hexagrams by writing a supplemental text further elaborating and conveying their attributes. Together with the original Judgments on the hexagrams written by King Wen, these works constitute the core of the modern Yijing.

B. CONFUCIANISM AND THE YIJING

“In the three thousand years since the Yijing was created as the court oracle of a Chinese Dynasty, it has been analyzed, annotated and embellished to such an extent that its original face has become all but unrecognizable,” laments Kerson Huang, a respected 20^th century interpreter of the Yijing.[53] Of all of its historical amendments, Huang disdains the commandeering of the Yijing by the Confucians the most. In his opinion, the Confucians suppressed its role as oracle and blatantly recast it as a treatise to justify their new ideals.[54] Regardless of interpretive standpoint, there is no denying that after Confucius, the Yijing would never be the same.

By 550 B.C. the Zhou Dynasty had largely melted away and Confucius, the sage of sages, was born into a lawless age. He labored to restore the chaotic Chinese world to a romanticized “Golden Era,” featuring compassionate emperors and loyal subjects.[55] Confucius looked to history and celebrated the deeds of ancient Chinese leaders like Yu, master of the Great Flood, transforming them into eternal representatives of virtuous government.[56] By elevating their humanism and pursuit of social justice, Confucius raised expectations of proper governance among the people while demanding that those in positions of authority “make conscious human development part of the overall operation of society itself, not only in public education but in the actual operation of government,[57] both for the general improvement of the mores of the people and for the cultivation of outstanding individuals with leadership qualities.”[58]

Yet, Confucius did not limit the pursuit of social responsibility to the aristocracy. His ideals are obligations upon everyone, for if people behave in a duteous manner – conscientiously fulfilling the requirements of their stations, no matter how high nor how low – then society’s problems will become manageable.[59] Epic virtues were attainable by all people who dedicated themselves to learning and self-cultivation, regardless of social class. [60] His disciples recorded his views as follows, in The Great Learning:

In ancient times, he who wished to let his virtue shine over all under Heaven must first govern his state well. To govern the state well, he must first unify his clan. To unify the clan, he must first cultivate himself. To cultivate himself, his heart must be in the right place. For the heart to be in the right place, he must have a sincere purpose. To have a sincere purpose, he must first acquire knowledge. The way to acquire knowledge is to study the nature of things.

When the nature of things is understood, knowledge is gained. When knowledge is gained, a sincere purpose can be set. When a sincere purpose is set, the heart can find the right place. When the heart is in the right place, the elf can be cultivated. When the self is cultivated, the clan can be unified. When the clan is unified, the state can be well-governed. When the state is well-governed, order can be brought to all under heaven . . . For the emperor and the common man alike, self-cultivation is the key.

Unfortunately, the hierarchical Confucian social structure has been used to justify despotism. The philosophy encompasses notions of loyalty and obedience to established authority, lending itself to usurpation as a moral underpinning for absolute rule.[61] Nothing could be further from Confucius’ intent. “Dictatorship and despotism were precisely what Confucius opposed; his idea of duty was an obligation to justice, not to personalities empowered by hereditary authority.”[62] Confucius thought that rulers who put on a pretense of justice and duty but were really motivated by profit or advantage were destroying the moral fiber of society.[63]

Indeed, the moral underpinnings of the Yijing foreshadow the noblest ideals of Confucianism: a respect for the natural order, social justice and esteem for self-cultivation.[64] Confucius himself claimed to have studied the Yijing tirelessly, famously stating “grant me a few more years to study the Yi, and I should then be able to avoid grave errors.”[65] He is said to have personally written the “Ten Wings” (also known as the “Commentaries”), a series of essays appended to the original Yi of King Wen and Duke Zhou.[66] These supplements are purportedly intended to help people understand the Yijing.[67] Though part of the modern canon, originalists like Huang blast the Commentaries as embellishments that distort the spirit and substance of the original Yijing.[68] The later Confucians largely repackaged the Yijing into a text expounding their philosophy when Confucianism became the official state creed during the third century.[69] As stated by Gernet, the Confucian Yijing became essential to court life of the famed Han Dynasty:

If it is permissible to speak of a renewal of classical studies and of Confucianism, this renewal took place under the aegis of the theories of yin and yang. The Classics, venerable products of remote antiquity, the works of eminent sages, were reckoned by the men of this period to contain secret knowledge, and their interpretation had therefore to be confined to schools of specialists, cabalist in nature. Their texts, often so concise as to be positively obscure, were very soon regarded as collections of prophecies and esoteric commentaries multiplied under the first Han emperors . . . The taste for esoteric commentaries and prophecies and also the use of omens for political ends seem to have been at their height at the end of the first Han dynasty, round about the beginning of the Christian era[70] . . . It is permissible to wonder why this philosophy was so successful. It may be that the development of a doctrine that claimed to give a complete explanation of the universe was favored by political circumstances.[71]

Despite their one-time monopoly on state power, the Confucians were not the only Chinese philosophical school to redress the Yijing to serve their own outlook.

C. TAOISM AND THE YIJING

In stark contrast to the Confucian social hierarchy, Taoist thinkers contrast the ideal of an independent, natural, free and happy life with the constraints of morality, ritual and political organization.[72] Laozi, whom the Taoists claim as their founding father, held that government was the root of all evil,[73] and argued that salvation lies in retirement and withdraw from the modern world.[74] Like the Confucians, however, they found a way to adapt the Yijing to their own worldview.

Taoists focused entirely upon the symbolism of the hexagrams. Dispensing with the text altogether, they built a numerological system akin to astrology around the hexagrams.[75] They harmonized the original Yijing with aspects from their “Five Elements Theory,” an explanation of existence which subdivides all things into five categories: Metal, Wood, Water, Fire and Earth.[76] This system seems to have been cultivated particularly in the academy of Ji Xia (稷下) at Linzi (临淄),[77] and by the legendary Zou Yan (邹衍) (c. 305 – 240 BC) for extending the Five Elements Theory to all spheres of knowledge: astronomy, geography, history and politics.[78] According to Zou Yan’s fundamental thesis, the rise and fall of political power is related to that of the Five Elements, the old always being destroyed by the new, in the order earth-wood-metal-fire-water.[79] Accordingly, the balance of these forces makes it possible to interpret multitudinous events, including the birth, zenith and decline of political power.[80] The intricacy became staggering, and a whole Taoist astrology grew up around the Yijing which dictated the ritual of the Qin dynasty, from the color of flags flown on certain days to the shape of ceremonial hats, from the length of contracts and justifying the severity of its laws.[81] This system also became a dominant influence in Chinese folk culture, and still touches the daily lives of millions of people through its role in liturgy, geomancy and medicine.

D. THE AGE OF LEGALISM

In the hands of the Zhou Dynasty’s soothsayers, the Yijing aided the development of mathematics, science and philosophy in the Chinese world.[82] Then, as always happens, the Zhou Dynasty retired, and the Era of the Warring States began with the advent of the Iron Age. The state of Qin was ultimately victorious, enveloping its rivals in 221 B.C.E. Though the first Dynasty to successfully unite all of China, it lasted a mere fifteen years. In that brief age, the Qin unified the Chinese currency as well as the gauge of cartwheels and written characters, and built a vast network of imperial roads, irrigation canals and the Great Wall.[83] Despite these advances, the Yijing was lucky to survive.

Qin was relatively poor and backwards, but fairly well protected in a secure, isolated river basin. Its emperor had no use for Confucianism. He and his advisors favored a realistic and absolutist policy based on the local facts of life.[84] They opted for the cold pragmatism of Legalism, a pertinacious approach to the acquisition and maintenance of centralized power.[85] To dogmatic Legalists, politics is an instrument independent of morality, a body of stratagems which ensure the power of the state.[86] Fearing that scholastic interest in moral codes may someday endanger a throne based on Legalism alone, the Qin Emperor ordered that 300 alleged Confucian scholars be buried alive and burned most books except for treatises on medicine, agriculture, divination, and a few other limited subjects.[87] Amazingly, the Yijing was spared from the literary purge because it was recognized as a book on divination.[88]

The Qin Dynasty died with its Emperor, and the two major forces of Chu and Han vied for the vacant throne. Han was victorious in 207 B.C., and though the original foundations of Han power were no different from those of its predecessor,[89] in time Confucianism was adopted as the official Han state creed.[90] The Yijing, including the Ten Wings, took a permanent place among the Confucian Classics, which had to be mastered by all of those who aspired to state office or civil service.[91] Thus, five hundred years after Confucius lived, the Yijing became enshrined as state doctrine.

E. THE MODERN YIJING

Western readers were introduced to the Yijing chiefly through Richard Wilhelm’s famous 1923 German translation, rendered into English by Cary F. Baynes. By this time, its original function as a vehicle for divination was considered secondary to its revelation of the cycle of Yin and Yang. Carl Jung used this version as a psychoanalytic tool, thereby increasing its exposure and helping to make it a prophet of the counterculture of the 1960’s.[92] While Jung prognosticated, the Chinese Communists reevaluated what role the Yijing would play in their new social order:

"The more emotionally inclined have proceeded to regard the Yijing as one of the most treasured parts of the Chinese tradition.[93] This was true even in the context of the Cultural Revolution, until Guo Moruo (郭沫若) was purged from his position as the foremost cultural official in Communist China. He devoted himself to the book extensively, particularly in his earlier years.[94] And when, in the early 1960’s, the ideological reigns were somewhat relaxed and it was possible for a time to deal with matters of intellectual concern, the two issues which engendered nationwide discussion were the ethical system of Confucius and the Yijing.[95] The phenomenon persists: wherever the chance for expression is present, the Yijing emerges as one of the foremost concerns of Chinese intellectuals."[96]

The modern reader must choose his or her own tact in approaching the Yijing. She can try to be faithful to the original face, or opt for the magical numerology of the Taoists, or favor the rigid moral interpretations of the Confucians. In all likelihood, the modern reader will employ some hybrid of these three systems. One’s present situation is revealed today by the name and the structure of the drawn heagram, together with analysis from King Wen’s Decisions, Confucius’s Commentaries, and Taoist Five Element Theory. Like the Chinese language itself, the Yijing speaks through images, not words. Reading the Yijing does not mean reading pedantic sentences but tailoring a personal understanding from archetypal, poetic images. Readers read it for their own purposes, interpreting it to their own agendas.

[1] Yì Jīng is the proper name of the text in Mandarin Chinese Pinyin; I Ching is its translation under the older Wade-Giles Romanization system. While the most famous English language resources introduced Western readers to the “I Ching” in the 20^th century, the authors of this article will refer to it by the now ubiquitous Pinyin system.

[2] Jacques Gernet, A History of Chinese Civilization, 2^nd Ed., Foster translation, 1999 (hereinafter “Gernet”) at 83; Alfred Huang, The Complete I Ching: The Definitive Translation from the Taoist Master Alfred Huang, 2004 (hereinafter “A. Huang”) at xvii:

“To the Chinese, the I Ching is like a Holy Bible written by the four most honored sages in our

history – Fu Xi, King Wen, the Duke of Zhou, and Confucius. The Chinese translation of Holy Bible is

Sheng Ching. Sheng is equivalent to “holy,” and Ching means “classic.” Chinese understand that Ching is

the Tao, the Truth, the holiest of the ancient books, and because they revere and respect the sacred writings

of the Jews and the Christian church, they honor the Bible by calling it Ching.”

[3] The Yijing that survived into modernity is the Zhou Yi. According to Gernet, there may have been many more than three, as each city state may have had its own oracle at one time. See Gernet, supra note 2, at 85.

[4] Gernet, supra note 2, at 83.

[5] John King Fairbank, The United States and China, 4^th Ed., 1976 (hereinafter “Fairbank”) at 17. The Shang Dynasty (商朝), the second Chinese Dynasty and first of the Bronze Age, is also widely known as the Yin Dynasty (殷代). This refers to Yin Du, a district within An Yang, the final and most significant capital city of the Shang/Yin Dynasty.

[6] Gernet, supra note 2, at 45.

[7] Kerson and Rosemary Huang, I Ching, 1987 (Hereinafter “K. Huang”) at 45. The T-shaped pattern of the cracks inspired the Chinese character for divination, bù (卜).

[8] K. Huang, supra note 7, at 45.

[9] Gernet, supra note 2, at 43.

[10] K. Huang, supra note 7, at 45.

[11] K. Huang, supra note 7, at 45; Gernet, supra note 2, at 41, 45. Anyang is located in modern day Henan Province.

[12] Gernet, supra note 2, at 47.

“The caste of soothsayers and scribes who were entrusted with royal divination were preoccupied by questions of number and questions relating to the calendar. Thus, a large number of sacrifices occurred on fixed dates or more irregularly, and the inscriptions have enabled historians to draw up a complete list of Shang kings.”

[13] Gernet, supra note 2, at 46.

[14] The ancient Chinese also used two sets of so-called “magic squares” to divine the future. Like the Ten Commandments, both are avowedly supernatural in origin. A dragon-horse is said to have emerged from the Yellow River bearing the “River Diagram” on his back during the time of Fuxi. Emperor Yu is supposed to have met a great striped tortoise in the Luo River while taming the Great Deluge, with the “Luo Tablet” carved onto its back. The sum of all odd integers on the periphery of the River Diagram is 20; on the Luo Tablet, they total 15. K. Huang, supra note 7, at 50-51.

[15] A. Huang, supra note 2, at xx.

[16] K. Huang, supra note 7, at 7.

[17] A. Huang, supra note 2, at 5; K. Huang, supra note 7, at 8.

[18] K. Huang, supra note 7, at 8.

[19] Id. Four of these trigrams are displayed on the flag of South Korea. Clockwise from the upper hoist, the trigrams symbolize: (i) heaven, the south and summer, (ii) the moon, the west, autumn and water, (iii) the earth, the north and winter, and (iv) the sun, the east, spring and fire. Alfred Znamierowski, The World Encyclopedia of Flags, 2002 at 177.

[20] K. Huang, supra note 7, at 7.

[21] K. Huang, supra note 7, at 7.

[22] Id. at 8. This multiplication allows for a much more nuanced level of representation.

[23] A. Huang, supra note 2, at 23.

[24] A. Huang, supra note 2, at 4.

[25] K. Huang, supra note 7, at 32.

[26] K. Huang, supra note 7, at 32.

[27] A. Huang, supra note 2, at xiii.

[28] K. Huang, supra note 7, at 32.

[29] A. Huang, supra note 2, at xiii.

[30] Gernet, supra note 2, at 85; K. Huang, supra note 7, at 52-55.

[31] A. Huang, supra note 2, at xv.

[32] Gernet, supra note 2, at 45.

[33] Gernet, supra note 2, at 45.

[34] Thomas Cleary, The Essential Confucius: The Heart of Confucius’ Teachings in Authentic I Ching Order, 1^st Ed., 1992 (hereinafter “Cleary”) at 7; see also K. Huang, supra note 7, at 7-8.

[35] Cleary, supra note 34, at 7.

[36] K. Huang, supra note 7, at 12.

[37] Id.

[38] Id.

[39] Id. at 13.

[40] Id. at 13. For example, the Duke of Zhou’s interpretation of Hexagram 64 – “UNFULFILMENT” – includes the passage, “rewards come from a great kingdom” to describe the fourth line.

[41] Id.

[42] Id. at 13-14.

[43] Id. at 14.

[44] Id. at 15-16.

[45] Id. at 16.

[46] Id.

[47] Cleary, supra note 34, at 8.

[48] K. Huang, supra note 7, at 18.

[49] Gernet, supra note 2, at 52.

[50] K. Huang, supra note 7, at 18.

[51] Id. That speech is recorded in the Book of Records.

[52] K. Huang, supra note 7, at 18:

“And disaster did befall the evil Jou. Conceding defeat, he retreated to the Deer Pavilion, scene of his

numerous past orgies. There, clasping to his bosom his priceless jade collection, Jou set himself on fire and burned to death. King Wu drove up in a chariot anf shot Jou’s body three times with arrows. Then he beheaded Jou’s corpse with a yellow ax, and hanged the head on a white banner for all to see.”

[53] K. Huang, supra note 7, at i.

[54] See generally Id.

[55] Cleary, supra note 34, at 7.

[56] Id.

[57] The political and intellectual leaders of a country were by definition holders of a trust, Confucius believed, and would ultimately be trusted by the people to the extent that they are truthful and faithful to that trust. Id. at 6.

[58] Cleary, supra note 34, at 2-3.

[59] Id. at 4.

[60] “[Confucius] envisioned a social order guided by reasonable, humane and just sensibilities, not by the passions of individuals arbitrarily empowered by hereditary status, and warned of the social consequences if men in positions of power considered personal profit and advantage over public humanity and justice. Confucius believed that the conduct of the affairs of a nation would benefit from the maximum participation in government by cultivated people whose intellects and emotions had been developed and matured by conscious culture . . . Confucius advocated the ideal cultured person, the exemplary individual. The word Confucius used to express this ideal was a class term that formerly meant scion of the ruling class, but he subsequently transformed it into an abstract moral ideal, a quality of character.” Id. at 1-2.

[61] Id. Confucius emphasized the virtue of justice, or zhong (忠义). This character can also be translated as “principle” or “duty,” and thus the true meaning has always been a matter of debate among Confucian scholars.

[62] Id. at 4.

[63] Id. at 4.

[64] See generally K. Huang, supra note 7, at 21-23.

[65] K. Huang, supra note 7, at 23.

[66] Id.; A. Huang, supra note 2, at 5.

[67] The first and second Wings are the Commentary on the Decisions; the third and forth Wings are the Commentary on the Symbols; the fifth and sixth Wings are known as the Great Treatise; the seventh Wing is Commentary on the Words of the Text; the eight Wing is the Discussion of the Gua; the ninth Wing is the Sequence of the Gua; and the tenth Wing is the Miscellaneous Notes on the Gua. See A. Huang, supra note 2, at 5.

[68] See generally K. Huang, supra note 7. For example, at 28, “We can see that the text [of the Ten Wings] is really quite straightforward and spontaneous, but the so-called image is pure gobbledegook, and the annotations only make it worse.”

[69] K. Huang, supra note 7, at 25; Gernet, supra note 2, at 159.

[70] Gernet, supra note 2, at 161.

[71] Gernet, supra note 2, at 162.

[72] Gernet, supra note 2, at 94.

[73] K. Huang, supra note 7, at 22.

[74] Gernet, supra note 2, at 93.

[75] K. Huang, supra note 7, at 39.

[76] K. Huang, supra note 7, at 39.

[77] Gernet, supra note 2, at 98.

[78] Gernet, supra note 2, at 98, 158.

[79] Gernet, supra note 2, at 158.

[80] Id.

[81] Id. at 159.

[82] Gernet, supra note 2, at 85.

[83] Gernet, supra note 2, at 106.

[84] Gernet, supra note 2, at 79. These included the aristocratic Shang Yang to the rich merchant Lu Pu-wei.

[85] Gernet, supra note 2, at 106-07.

[86] Gernet, supra note 2, at 91.

[87] Gernet, supra note 2, at 109.

[88] K. Huang, supra note 7, at 26; Richard Wilhelm et al., The I Ching, or Book of Changes, 3^rd Ed., 1967, at lxi.

[89] Gernet, supra note 2, at 110.

[90] K. Huang, supra note 7, at 25; see also Gernet, supra note 2, at 111:

“It was only in the long run and as a result of a complex process of evolution that the Han Empire departed further from these origins. All kinds of factors were involved in this evolution: economic expansion, changes in the relationship between the Chinese world and the world of the steepe, strengthening of the palace at the expense of the civil service, weakening of the state’s hold on the peasantry, rise of the families of the rich and gentry, and so on.”

[91] K. Huang, supra note 7, at 25.

[92] K. Huang, supra note 7, at i.

[93] Richard Wilhelm et al., The I Ching, or Book of Changes, 3^rd Ed., 1967, at XX.

[94] Id. at xx.

[95] Id. at xx.

[96] Gernet, supra note 2, at xvii.

Article Review: “Interpreting Sacred Texts: Preliminary Reflections on Constitutional Discourse in China” by Janet Ainsworth (1992).

2009-10-16T01:42:00.002+08:00

Article Review: “Interpreting Sacred Texts: Preliminary Reflections on
Constitutional Discourse in China” by Janet Ainsworth (43 Hastings Law Journal 273, 1992).

In contrast to the last article reviewed here [Ritual and Constitutionalism: Disputing the Ruler’s Legitimacy in a Confucian Polity (Chaihark Hahm, 2009)], Ainsworth holds that “the Confucian classics…were not, of course, a constitution.” Notwithstanding her more restrictive definition of “constitution,” it is hard to find where she disagrees. Ainsworth uses this article to assert that paradigms of Confucian interpretation are highly relevant to modern discourse in that the traditional Confucian methods indicate a proper model for modern Chinese constitutional interpretation. These are interesting and useful conceptions to master for a discussion of Chinese constitutionalism. However, to the extent that she uses the Western Judeo-Christian textual tradition as a counterpoint, Ainsworth fails to be convincing.

Like Hahm, Ainsworth notes that the Confucian canon was originally composed of Five Classics that were later supplemented by Four Books (see previous post for details). The Five Classics were codified throughout the late Zhou Dynasty (112 – 221 B.C.), but most were suppressed and burned in an infamous literary inquisition by the Qin Emperor in 213 B.C. With his regime’s foundation resting on the cold science of legalism alone, Confucian teachings that elevate the moral individual to higher status could have been viewed as subversive, even as threatening. This purge created a schism within Confucianism. The Qin Dynasty was short-lived, and the scholars of its successor Han Dynasty eventually attempted to reconstruct the Classics from vestiges of official records and personal memory. These, and the commentaries on the texts by contemporary scholars, became known as the “New Texts.” Their proponents vied for doctrinal authority against interpreters of alleged original copies (i.e., “Old Texts”) which had somehow survived the inquisition and been discovered later. By the end of the Han, the “Old Texts” had achieved dominance.

The important thing to note is that, perhaps directly because of the Old/New split, “one of the most striking characteristics of the Confucian canon is its openness, its resistance to closure. Classical scholars over the centuries felt free to propose additions or deletions to the Confucian canon.” Ainsworth cites the works of the Neo-Confucians and the scholarly whittling of the Book of Rites from 204 to 49 chapters. Prior to the split, Confucius himself excised major portions of the Book of Poetry. For the purposes of my upcoming paper, I add to this list Confucius’s addition of Commentary to the Yijing, or Book of Changes. In addition, Taoism, Confucianism’s great rival school in Chinese thought, also got into the act of reinterpreting ancient documents to fit their own agenda. About the same time that the Confucians were supplementing and recasting the Yijing, the Taoists also proposed a theory of interpretation based upon their “Five Elements Theory.” To modern scholars of the Yijing, both lenses (although once fundamentally opposed) are now often presented in unison.

Ainsworth proposes that this longstanding practice of textual exegesis carries with it a very different set of assumptions as those inherent in the traditional Western Judeo-Christian tradition. There are two key ways.

First, in a word, in the Eastern Confucian tradition, foundational texts have always been considered somewhat more “contestable,” and thus more malleable than their Western counterparts. As Ainsworth states:

“Just as the Confucian canon was singularly resistant to closure, so, too, modern Chinese constitutions have been open to contest and change. The frequency with which Chinese constitutions have been replaced has been viewed by most Western observers in a negative light because the Western sacred text archetype for interpreting foundation texts regards such texts as the embodiment of truths, which, if not absolutely immutable and eternal, ought to be exceedingly resistant to change. When seen in light of the Chinese textual exegetical tradition, however, the Chinese openness to constitutional change is entirely consistent with the interpretive assumptions inherent in the Confucian canonical tradition. As we have seen, the political grammar of China has consistently utilized the contestability of its foundational texts as a primary mode of political discourse.”

I think that this argument is valid but underdeveloped. In making her comparison, Ainsworth ignores the fact that the foundational work of Judeo-Christian thought, the Torah (i.e. first five books of the Bible), was expanded first to the Tanakh, then into the Old Testament, and eventually supplemented with the New Testament. The Han Dynasty, whose scholars are largely responsible for salvaging and repackaging Confucianism, were operating between 206 BCE–220 CE, during the exact same era many debates were occurring over the canon of Judaism and Christianity. And while China has had four constitutions since 1949, none of them were meant to be permanent. The 1954 document, modeled on the 1936 Soviet model, was meant to exist only until a higher stage of socialism was achieved. Its immediate successor in 1975 was used to legitimize the extreme of the Cultural Revolution and, mercifully, did not last long. In 1978 with a change of regimes within the CCP a new transitional constitution was adopted, and the one established in 1982 was adopted with a much higher expectation of permanency. All in all, while there have been four documents, it is possible to subdivide New China into two major constitutional epochs: pre and post 1978 (i.e., the rise of Deng Xiaoping). This brief blog post is too short to consider the extent to which the words of the US Constitution, while often permanent, have come to mean completely different and perhaps opposite things through judicial review, but US constitutional scholars have identified at least three distinctive epochs of American constitutionalism (pre-Civil War, post-Civil War, and New Deal).

Ainsworth’s second point/distinction is much more fascinating:

“In a second parallel between the Confucian canon and modern Chinese constitutions, both structure their discourse as prescriptive of utopian goals rather than as descriptive of contractual obligations enforceable against the state…the Confucian canon contained no covenants. Rather, the Confucian texts comprised a set of ethical prescriptions about the way a superior person ought to live and how a perfect social order ought to be structured…all four Chinese constitutions have contained numerous articles intended as hortative prescriptions for the new China rather than as legally executable provisions. For example, several provisions of the 1982 constitution proclaim that the state will promote various aspects of an idealized social order, such as a more advanced economy (art 14), an improved educational system (art 19), increased scientific development and technological innovation (art 20), promotion of an “advanced culture” of high ideals and ethics (art 24), and equality between the sexes in all aspects of political, economic, cultural, social and family life (art 48).”

The list goes on. These substantive goals of government are not spelt out in the American constitution, which is a largely procedural document. It describes the process by which the government can curtail life, liberty or property, as well as a list of prohibitions and restraints on government activities, but imposes very few positive obligations beyond promoting the "general welfare." The most famous instance of American constitutionalism addressing substantive rights and obligations of citizens occurs in the abortive 18^th Amendment which prohibited the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within the United States in 1919. It was overturned by the 21^st Amendment just 14 years later, in 1933. In fact, while to the observer of the late 20^th and early 21^st centuries the US constitution does seem immutable, the number and frequency of constitutional amendments passed in the early 20^th century seems to suggest that the American populace can periodically become “drunk,” so to speak, with tweaking the text of its foundational documents, but have on the whole have rejected including substantive obligations on the government in their foundational text.

In short, Ainsworth provides an important contribution: the extent to which substantive legal norms and humane goals are blatantly enshrined in the text of the Chinese foundational documents while absent in their Western counterparts may owe in part to deeply-embedded Confucian conceptions of the proper role of the state. However, the extent to which this article suggests that Chinese constitutional interpretation differs from its Western counterparts due to a unique rubric of liberal Confucian exegesis is unconvincing.

Article Review: Ritual and Constitutionalism: Disputing the Ruler’s Legitimacy in a Confucian Polity, by Chaihark Hahm

2009-09-17T03:25:00.009+08:00

A Review of Ritual and Constitutionalism: Disputing the Ruler’s Legitimacy in a Confucian Polity, by Chaihark Hahm (Associate Professor of Law at Yonsei University, Korea). Newly published in the American Journal of Comparative Law, Volume 57, Issue 1 / Winter 2009.

Hahm has produced a fascinating article that explores the role of ritual as a constitutional norm for restraining and disciplining the rule of a sovereign. To do so, he must establish that ritual norms were once worthy of constitutional discourse. Thus, his analysis considers the role of ritual within the last great Confucian society, the Choson Dynasty of 17th Century Korea. According to legend, Choson was founded by Jizi, uncle and Prime Minister to the last Emperor of the Shang Dynasty. Emperor Jou's name, to this day, is synonymous for "debauched tyrant" for the Caligula-like way he ran the Empire. After the ascendant Zhou dynasty liberated the capital Minister Jizi was released, but he did not wish to serve the new Kingdom. Instead, he migrated northeast with 5,000 followers and founded Choson. A tomb in Pyongyang bears his name. The high Shang and Zhou Dynasties of China are periods revered as a "Golden Age" of Confucianism.

After the 1662 fall of the like-minded Ming Dynasty (大明国) in China, Choson Korea shifted from deferring to the practices of its elder-sister state to a siege mentality. As the last ideological bastion of Confucian-statesmanship in the known world, the leaders of the Choson became more strict, conservative and vigilant in protecting their interpretation of Confucian tradition. As an independent center of doctrinal authority, the Choson court now had to look within to interpret its own laws.

Hahm nicely sets out the canon of work that had authoritative legal influence in the Confucian system. It was generally accepted by 17th Century Choson that “Five Classics” and “Four Books” form this volume (although many Chinese Confucian scholars claim that there were 13 total classics). The “Five Classics” (Wujing) are, and I use their original Chinese names:

1) Shijing (Poetry -- 311 poems dating from the Zhou Dynasty [1027-771 BC] to the Spring & Autumn Period [770-476 BC]),
2) Shujing (The earliest known record of Chinese history -- 58 chapters of the 6th century BC. The first five recall the deeds of the legendary emperors as Yao and Shun; the next 4 recall the fabled Xia Dynasty; the next 17 deal with the Shang Dynasty and its collapse under an oppressive and extravagant ruler; the final 32 cover the Zhou Dynasty.
3) Yijing (Changes – outlining a complex divination system from antiquity that was later commandeered by the Confucians),
4) Chunqiu (Spring and Autumn Annals -- a chronicle of the State of Lu from 722 BC to 481 BC), and
5) Lijing (Ritual -- describes ancient rites and court ceremonies).

The “Four Books” refer to:

1) the Analects (a record of the words and acts Confucius and his disciples),
2) Mencius, (an honored interpreter of Confucianism),
3) The Great Learning, (a short text attributed to the teachings of Confucius and his disciple, Zeng Zi. Selected by neo-Confucian Zhu Xi during the Song Dynasty as a foundational introduction to Confucianism), and
4) the Doctrine of the Mean (a Confucian guide to perfecting oneself into a sage).

From the basis of the adoption of these classics as law by the Choson Dynasty (initially as a means of legitimizing their rise to power and later for ordering society), Hahm argues that these sources of ritual served to constrain the Kings of the Choson Dynasty, especially in the later Neo-Confucian era. Problems were largely resolved by adopting a uniform scholarly interpretation of these texts, specifically that of Zhu Xi. After the fall of the Ming, such a domestic orthodoxy was seen as pertinent in a time of anxiety about national security. Nonetheless, a crisis of interpretation arose. Hahm cites a famous episode in Korean history to prove that ritual was a higher source than law to discipline the rulers, because it spoke to the very legitimacy of the dynasty.

A central tenet of Confucianism is patrilineal descendency, i.e., a passing of the family line from father to eldest son. This had a stronger ancient practice in China than it ever did in Korea, where passage of daughters was traditionally acceptable, but was eventually adopted. Nonetheless, over the 500 year history of Choson, only about half the monarchs were first born.

King Hyojong (r. 1649-1659), the 17th monarch of Choson, was one such exception. He was the second son of King Injo (r. 1623-49), whose first son and crown prince, Sohyon, died in 1645. That would not be odd, except that Sohyon had several children including an eldest son. Over protests from scholar officials, Injo named Hyojong the new crown prince. This was likely due to apprehension about national security and the danger of passing the throne to an infant in a time of war. Anyway, the ritual crisis regarded the behavior of the queen-dowager: should she mourn the death of Hyojong for one year (the period prescribed for younger sons) or three years (the period prescribed for the eldest son)?

Two rival camps within the Choson court vied to answer this question. The Soin (Westerners) were purists and strict constructionists, faithful to the interpretations of Zhu Xi. They asserted Hyojong’s private status, as Sohyon’s younger brother, to invoke a one year period of mourning. Their rivals, the Namin (Southerners) were also loyal Confuscianists but believed that other sources of interpretation beyond Zhu Xi could be authoritative. The Namin saw the Soin claim as incorrect and potentially dangerous. If Hyojong were only mourned for a year, it could be perceived that his rise to power was illegitimate and thus used as a ploy to return the throne to Sohyon’s line. They asserted that all sovereigns deserve the highest degree of mourning, regardless of private status within the family. They cited examples from antiquity in Confucian China, such as King Wu of the ancient Zhou Dynasty and Emperor Gaozu of the Han who each achieved the highest office despite having older brothers.

Both camps were thoroughly Neo-Confucian and loyal to Choson, but the result of their struggle could nonetheless have altered the very course of Korean history. In the end the more powerful faction, the Soin, won. Hyojong’s son, Hyonjong, banned all discussion on the problematic matter (fearing instability) and the affairs of state moved on, though bitter vindictiveness would poison Choson politics for generations to come. Indeed, Hyonjong himself would come to support the Namin view years later in a second ritual controversy regarding the death of Hyojong’s mother, but he died before the issue was settled. The Namin would remain marginalized for the remainder of the Dynasty.

This article, while highly focused and specialized, adds a new legal dimension to Confucian studies and pre-modern constitutionalism. The lessons within are worthy in a comparative context in the modern Western sense, as well. The UK uses an unwritten and ancient constitutional system, and until very recently had no supreme court to settle interpretive disputes. Constitutional lawyers in the USA are well versed in “original intent” and “strict constructionism” or “textualism” as means of reading the Constitution.

I am thankful to Hahm for shedding this light, opening this avenue of research, and providing a great primer on legal-Confucianism. This is perhaps the most interesting article I’ve read yet this year. I am conducting scholarship on the vestigial elements of Confucianism inherent in the modern Chinese Communist social order, and Hahm's article will doubtlessly prove to be invaluable.

Tracing the Origins and Future of the Chinese Investment Corporation Through the Progression of Chinese Ideological Development

2009-09-07T02:25:00.003+08:00

Larry Backer recently authored an interesting piece entitled, “The Chinese Communist Party and the Governance Structures of SWFs and SOEs: ‘Unswervingly Uphold the Party’s Core Political Status in SOEs” on his blog which discusses China’s premier Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF), the China Investment Corporation (CIC). In it he makes two overall points: first, that the international treatment of SWFs has been somewhat naïve, proposing to treat SWFs as private entities while ignoring the constitutional realities of SWF-hosting states; second, that the Chinese SWF in particular is prone to the political motivations of its host government and Communist party, as evinced by the application of scientific development concept to its management. I would like to add to both of his points.

First, as regards Backers first point, though SWFs have been around for decades, the recent inception of the CIC and its political symbiosis provoked a general panic never before seen about SWF proliferation. There are many explanations for this reflex: first, the CIC’s available reserves heralded a massive global economic power shift from West to East; second, China’s vast foreign exchange reserves could easily destabilize international financial markets if unchecked; third, it forecasts a return of state-capitalism after decades of privatization; fourth, it is intimately connected to the Chinese Government and the CCP. The inception so worried Western governments that in May 2008, shortly after the establishment of the CIC, the IMF established and commissioned the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds to conduct a dialogue among participants identifying SWF best practices. The result — the Santiago Principles — was published in October 2008. This set of “generally accepted principles and practices” (GAPP) claims to reflect the current investment practices, appropriate governance and accountability arrangements, and policy objectives of SWF wielding nations.

However, these principles are merely a voluntary code lacking any binding force. Both Larry and I agree that these Principles present a relatively simplistic analysis of the situation, grounded in the Western notion that public entities can be treated as substantially private as regards their financial activities. I recall that none of the Principles bar State-SWF symbiosis or their projection into private markets. Perhaps the 19th Santiago Principle comes the closest to reflecting Western hesitation by stating that SWF investment decisions, “should aim to maximize risk-adjusted financial returns in a manner consistent with investment policy, and based on economic and financial grounds.” Sub-principle 19.1 stipulates that, “[i]f investment decisions are subject to other than economic and financial considerations, these should be clearly set out in the investment policy and be publicly disclosed.” The specter of the CIC or other SWFs being used to channel massive state capital flows as a disguised form of aggressive foreign policy or a destabilizing weapon for political ends is apparent between the lines.

I note, however, in my recent article, Negocio de China: Building upon the Santiago Principles to form an Effective International Approach to Sovereign Wealth Fund Regulation, Hong Kong Law Journal, Vol. 39, Part 1, Fall 2009, that the CIC made its initial investments very cautiously to appease these fears:

"Thus far the CIC has been a model actor, constraining its activities to stricter codes of conduct than those requested by the Santiago Principles.The CIC often accepts limiting itself to purchases of non-voting share stock and rarely purchases more than a 10 per cent stake in target companies."

The CIC notes this compromise in its 2008 Annual Report, both in the overview:

"The CIC’s initial international investments includedminority stakes (under 10%) in U.S. firms MorganStanley and the Blackstone Group. Subsequentinvestment activity has included limited portfolioinvestment, largely through internationally recognized investment management firms,in-house management and commitments to asmall number of private equity firms. CIC is well positioned for 2009 and beyond with significant capital available for investment."

And further seeks to calm skeptical market regulators in the section entitiled “Investment Strategy and Management”:

"Five basic principles underlie [the CIC’s] investment approach and strategy:

1) The underlying investment objective is longterm, sustainable, risk-adjusted returns for its shareholder.
2) CIC is a financial investor. As such, it does not seek to control enterprises or sectors.
3) CIC invests on a commercial basis.
4) CIC is a responsible investor which abides by local laws and regulations in the countries in which it invests, and takes its corporate social responsibility seriously. For example, while there are no restrictions on the sectors in which it can invest, it chooses not to pursue investments in industries, such as tobacco and gaming, that would not be in keeping with its social responsibility.
5) CIC’s investments are research driven to provide a basis for sound, unbiased investment decisions and allocation driven to assure a disciplined approach to investing."

This self-policing has been a result of bilateral agreements between the CIC and the host corporations and governments, though the CIC need not be so careful according to the letter of the Santiago Principles. GAPP Principle 21 states that SWFs view shareholder ownership rights as a fundamental element of their equity investments' value. Indeed, stronger resistance has been noted in the tumultuous Rio Tinto effort, where access to strategic natural resources is at stake.

2) Second, on the point of Chinese ideological platforms being installed into the CIC, I think it is important to spell out something that has not been before: that is, the CIC would not exist but-for revolutions and progressions in Chinese ideological thought.

It’s a truism that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) maintains an intimate relationship with the China Investment Corporation (CIC), China’s largest SWF. Larry first outlined the nature of their relationship well in his article Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis: Global Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds, State Owned Enterprises and the Chinese Experience, Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, Vol. 19(1), 2009:

"CIC, as positioned at the premium cabinet-level within the Chinese government, is responsible directly to the State Council through the State Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC). This is meant to effect the policy of separation of economic and political functions within the state apparatus. But that separation is effected only functionally. SOEs, like the political elements of state administration remain subject to the overall direction of the CCP and subject to the direction of state policy…the CCP is also represented within the organizational structure of CIC. CIC’s Party committee has six seats…In addition virtually all of the governing officers are members of the CCP. As cadres, they owe an overarching duty to implement the party line in accordance with the important political principle of democratic centralism. As a consequence there is a close and necessary connection between state, party and fund that exists beyond the formal limitations of fund objectives and which, in the interests of state and Party, may supersede technically narrow readings of such limitations."

Larry goes on to elaborate how those cadres are CCP members who are accountable to the Party through the new aegis of Scientific Development. I would like to add to his insightful commentary how I believe the CIC is more than that; it is a manifestation and prime example of the progression of Chinese ideological thought from Three Represents to Scientific Development and ultimately, I hope, to the Harmonious Society.

Indeed, the CIC is itself a tangible manifestation of the Scientific Development concept, through Dengism and Jiang Zemin’s Important Thought of the Three Represents. It begins with Deng, who in the wake of the Chinese instability of 1989-1992, announced on his grand southern tour that China would open up to the world, and that the pursuit of wealth and financial independence would be new official goals for the nation. Thus giving the green light for capitalistic activity, the Chinese people went about the work of rebuilding a commercial society, and monies quickly flowed in. That income, in turn, was used to build a large reserve of U.S. dollars in the form of U.S. Treasury Bills, the world’s favorite reserve vehicle since the end of World War II. But for Deng’s proclamation and economic liberalization, the funds to sponsor a CIC would not exist.

Yet, the CIC’s existence would also be dependant upon an ideological breakthrough. The financial talent and expertise necessary to run such a venture is not available at the grassroots level, and barely existed at all in China before 1990. The input of China’s sophisticated financial elite, those honing their craft since Deng’s proclamation and the establishment of the Chinese stock markets, needed to be incorporated in the new project. That is where Jiang’s Important Thought of the Three Represents grants ideological justification for the CIC’s existence. Originated by Liu Ji and Wang Huning, two theoreticians and long-time aides to Jiang Zemin, the Three Represents stand for:

1. The party should represent the advanced productive forces in society
2. the party should represent advanced modern culture
3. the party should represent the interests of the vast majority of the people.

The main policy significance, to both Jiang and the CIC, is in the first of the Represents. Arguing that the class composition of the Chinese proletariat had evolved due to two decades of economic reforms, this opened up recruitment of advanced productive forces in society to the CCP, i.e., entrepreneurs and intellectuals from the private sector. It signaled that the CCP would become a party of elites, especially commercial elites, like many other ruling parties in Asia. In exchange for political cover for their business interests, the co-opted elite would accept the political guidance of the CCP. In the years to follow, the CCP attempted to install party cells in many private-sector enterprises, with arguable degrees of success. See Bruce Dickson, Beijing’s Ambivalent Reformers, Current History, Sept 2004 at 250. In any event, the CIC’s membership of relatively sophisticated money managers and investors could not have been justified to the Chinese public without the Three Represents thought built upon Dengism.

Looking at the membership of the CIC’s Board of Directors, it becomes apparent that they would not be in their present posts but-for the inclusionary policy of the Three Represents. For example, Vice Chairman, President Gao Xiqing is the Vice Chairman worked as Vice Chairman at the China Securities Regulatory Commission, General Counsel and Director General of the Public Offering Supervision Department, and Deputy Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Bank of China International (Holdings) Limited. He holds a law degree from Duke University. His comrade, Li Yong, a Non-Executive Director of the CIC, served as the Director General of the World Bank Department under the Ministry of Finance and Executive Director of the World Bank's China Office, assignments that would not have been possible minus the vision of Deng and Jiang.

Jiang’s successor, Hu Jintao, built upon the Three Represents to expand the public welfare to all people through the Scientific Development concept. He introduced in an inspection trip to rural Jiangxi Province in 2003 and after two years of development at the Central Party School further elaborated it in late 2005. See Hu Jintao, “Comprehensively Implement and Fulfill the Scientific Development Concept,” Qiushi, 1, 2006. Though a broad “umbrella-concept,” with time Scientific Development has come to be understood as institutionalizing a certain flexibility across a broad range of sectors of Chinese life. Its most apparent manifestations, those campaigns intended to increase the CCPs governing capacity, provide a cushion to permit mistakes and backtracking from bad policy decisions without affecting the legitimacy of the overall regime. Now institutionalized, corruption and ill-advised policy measures can be attributed to bad individuals rather than a bad government. There was a good, old fashioned “rectification” campaign in three phases over 2005 which weeded out about 45,000 party members, installation of anti-corruption mechanisms, and a revitalization of local party aparatuses. The opening paragraph of the CIC’s 2008 annual report (http://www.swfinstitute.org/research/CIC_2008_annualreport_en.pdf) resonates with this concept, providing cover for an annual loss of -2.8% and speaking to the CIC’s personnel policy:

"Though CIC is a young organization – less than two years old – it has made substantial progress in implementing the development strategy set by the Board of Directors and coping with a once-in-a-century global financial crisis, while at the same time recruiting a highly qualified domestic and international staff, developing operating plans and strategies, building its organization and making its first investments."

Larry does a great job explaining the application of Hu Jintao’s Scientific Development concept on the context of the CIC. He incorporates at length a passage from a telling recent article published in the People’s Daily Online (Aug 27, 2009) that is worth repeating:

"To firmly establish the Party's core political status in corporate governance in SOEs is a valuable experience, drawing on the practice of reform and development over the past 30 years, and also an important principle which should be firmly grasped to strengthen and improve Party building work in SOEs, which reflects the distinctive characteristics and fundamental requirements of the modern state-owned enterprise system with Chinese characteristics.

As a basic means to play the core political role, the Party shall actively participate in deciding the enterprise’s vital issues. The Party committee in an enterprise should seriously study, discuss, and put forward opinions and suggestions for such issues as the overall development of the enterprise, important personnel appointments and removals, as well as the vital interests of workers and staff members. The unified decision-making power of the board of directors on major issues should be supported, while the views of the Party committee should also be respected and reflected. Thus, the participation of the Party in deciding vital issues integrates with the decision making of the board under law.

As a key means to play the core political role, the Party shall play a leading role in the talent selection and appointment. The leading role is reflected in determining employment standards, recommending candidates, as well as improving evaluation systems, strengthening supervision and management, and training back-up human resources and so on. [The Party shall] adhere to the combination of both principles that are the Party manages cadres and the board of directors selects operators and managers in accordance with law. Operators and managers of an enterprise should have the power and discretion in hiring employees according to law. The Party committee shall evaluate and recommends candidates, while the enterprise hires following the market rules. [The enterprises shall also] enforce reforms of personnel system to institutionalize, standardize and routinize the hiring process, to meet the dual requirements of corporations as legal persons and the guidance status of Party committees.

As a fundamental means to play the core political role, the Party shall ensure the implementation of principles and policies from the Party and state. The Party committee in enterprises should focus not only on supervising human resources, finance and materials as well as responsible persons and key positions, but also on monitoring the implementation of the scientific concepts of development and national policies, to promote enterprises to play a leading role in carrying out political and social responsibility. At the same time it must also balance relationships between the state, the enterprise, and the workers, actively coordinate various conflicts of interest, earnestly safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of the state and workers, maintain the ideological stability of workers, and promote the harmonious development of enterprises.

To really implement the core political status of Party committee in the corporate governance of SOEs...Playing a central role by Party committee in enterprises is a unique advantage of SOEs. Only continuously improving the leadership and organizational management system in SOEs can well combine the two advantages and turn the Party's ideological, political, and mass work advantage into the core competitiveness of SOEs, which can consolidate the core political status of the Party, make Party-building work a key part in the enterprise value chain, and make the Party committee an integral part in the modern state-owned enterprise system with Chinese characteristics.

We believe that, as long as the Party committees in the SOEs keep an enthusiastic and diligent attitude, look for the truth and being practical, never allow laches, we will create a new situation of Party building work in SOEs. Id.

"

It is my hope that the CIC go beyond a Three Represents mindset to one of Hu’s broader vision of a Harmonious Society through the Scientific Development Concept. The Harmonious Society concept is often explained as a shifting of state priorities from the first of Jiang’s Three Represents (the advanced productive forces) to the third (the interests of the vast majority of the people). Hu is widely credited for sensing the growing divide between the rich and poor in China and reformulating the Three Represents focus and corresponding state policy to counterbalance this inequity. SWFs, including the CIC, have a promising humanitarian role to play. They provide an opportunity for unprecedented public wealth creation which can be channeled into health care, education, research and development, infrastructure, etc. China, in particular, has earned the right to all of the money it is investing and its increased role on the international stage. However, the CIC claims to recognize that "Our mission is to make long-term investments that maximize risk-adjusted financial returns for the benefit of the State, our shareholder." (see CIC 2008 Annual Report, available at http://www.swfinstitute.org/research/CIC_2008_annualreport_en.pdf). China’s leaders of State must remember that the incredible work ethic of its people is the source of the nation’s new wealth, and apply the proceeds of investing it accordingly. If Hu Jintao’s Harmonious Society concept is heartily integrated into the investment and management strategy of the CIC, then the people shall benefit.

Sichuan One Year Later: A Service Trip with the Rotaract Club of Macau

2009-05-24T02:26:00.005+08:00

Just over one year ago, on May 12th, a magnitude 8-earthquake struck Sichuan, China. The epicenter was Wenchuan, a county 80 kilometers (50 mi) northwest of Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan. It is believed that well over 80,000 died in the quake, with upwards of 400,000 injured. Furthermore, the earthquake left about five million people homeless. Strong aftershocks, some exceeding magnitude 6, continued to hit the area for months after the main quake. When the Earthquake occurred, I wrote about it here: A Prayer for Sichuan.

Fortunately, President Hu Jintao announced a rapid response, and State Premier Wen Jiabao (the second highest ranking government official in China) flew to the earthquake area within 1.5 hours of the main quake to oversee rescue operations. In stark contrast to the contemporary catastrophe in Burma, China embraced offers of help from foreign governments and invited teams of foreign rescue workers to assist in the immediate aftermath. Later, Beijing announced that it will spend 1 trillion yuan (about US$150 billion) over the next three years to rebuild. The disaster became a rallying cry for the Chinese as they prepared for and hosted the 2008 Olympic Games.

Last week I was honored to attend a service project to the affected region organized by the Rotaract Club of Macau. Although brief, the trip was well-organized and allowed us intimate access to sensitive areas, including many school children affected by the disaster. I was able to see first-hand the extent of the damage, the progress of the repairs, and the spirit of the locals. For another perspective and much better account than mine, please read a blogpost written by one of my partners on the trip, available here.

Chengdu is the main center for commerce and culture in Southwest China, and has been a political capital since antiquity. Before 316 BC it was the capital of the Zhou Shu kingdom. It became the capital of Liu Bei’s Kingdom of Shu during the Three Kingdoms era (AD 220), prospered during the Tang dynasty, and became the capital of Sichuan in 1368. It retains that title today. Developing outside of the mainstream flow of Chinese life, Chengdu has a different feel from many Eastern cities where rapid development is quickly displacing local architecture and traditions. Chengdu also boasts a longstanding reputation for academia and culture, evinced by 14 universities, thousands of tea houses and a relaxed lifestyle.

Unfortunately we didn’t have a lot of time to embrace those things. Instead, we had the humble assignment of introducing the middle-school students of Sichuan to Macau. When we arrived at our hotel, we had a meeting where the plan was devised. Our meetings with the schoolchildren would take place in four acts. First, a video from the Macau tourism council would be shown to introduce the children to Macau, followed by a Q&A session where the children could win prizes for correct answers. That would be followed by a game where the class was divided into teams, and one representative would have to get his or her teammates to guess what was displayed on the wall behind without using any of the characters. Third, we’d perform a rough magic show including tricks with straws, ropes, chains, crayons and cards. With any time left, the children would perform their talents for us.

In total, we visited four middle schools and one relocation camp for people who had lost their homes in the earthquake. Per our instructions, we avoided any mention of the earthquake itself, leaving that to the teachers and counselors. Our job was simply to provide and hour and a half of diversion to those we encountered.

On the first day we went to two schools. Both were very modern schools with relatively high English ability among the students, and no school uniforms. Each welcomed us with large signs for the occassion. The second was a boarding school with outstanding facilities, including large gardens and communal property sharing parlors, better than some smaller American college campuses. The children were happy we came, and sad to see us go. The schools took a while to get to by bus, so in between and afterward we had two large Sichuan meals. At dinner, we were treated to a famous local face-changing opera followed by beautiful ribbon twirlers. The two schools and two extravagant meals accounted for the whole day, although a few of us went to a local grocery store to buy cheap tea later that evening.

The second day we split between a single school compound and a relocation camp. The school was much more humble than the ones from the day before, operating out of temporary trailers. The student body, though relatively small, was combined from four schools which had been destroyed in the earthquake. This and the visit to the relocation camp were our first apparent introductions to the damage. The school children wore bright red uniforms and were very happy for the games and attention, but too smart to fool with our simple magic tricks.

Although mostly deserted during the day, a few new mothers and elderly peasants lined the narrow alleyways between trailers at the adult relocation camp. Each alleyway had its own unique decorations and optimistic name, however, proving that the residents were making the most of their current situation. Though cramped and damp, people took great pride in decorating their own trailer with colorful ornamentations. Even some small personal businesses operated within the compound. At the end of the tour we heard music and moved to its source. In a small classroom, about 30 elderly inhabitants were having a music class. A pair of musicians was playing the clarinet and an accordion at the head of the room while the others – mostly women – sang from homemade songbooks. I introduced myself to the clarinet player and he allowed me to borrow his instrument, which had some keys held together with scotch tape, in order to play a tune for the group. Being out of practice I opted for a song I didn’t need to think about, “The Star Spangled Banner.” After returning to the city, we had a local Chengdu hot pot dinner feast before retiring.

On the third day, we went 2 hours by bus to Beichuan Middle School. Beichuan was the hardest hit of all the schools, losing several thousand students. In some especially tragic cases, only a single child survived out of an entire class. Thus, the new schoolyard has been constructed over an hour away from the old one, operating on some land donated by a factory. At the entrance to the schoolyard were students selling books which they published, featuring short stories about the earthquake authored by the children within.

Now lined with rows of trailers that serve as classrooms, dormitories and mess halls, the new schoolyard has been a revolving door for Chinese education and psychology Ph.D.’s over the past year. One towering Chinese man has remained from the very first day; he is the school’s administrator. He gave a humbling introduction about what the kids had been through, and how their ongoing counseling is progressing. Our tour of the compound included an entire row of trailers dedicated to psychological rehabilitation through humble means including counseling by drawing pictures, writing notes or playing in sandboxes. One room had a small portion labeled as a workroom, but really serves as a place where teachers can hide away and cry in private, if necessary.

After lunch we finally met the children. As others set up the projector, the teacher asked me to help her translate some unusual items into English…such as “power outlet.” Then, our presentation began, but it paled in comparison to what the children performed for us. We had extra time, so the children were able to spontaneously showcase their individual talents. A couple of children sang, while one little girl turned on her MP3 playing phone and did an exotic hip-hop dance to the cheers and whistles of her male classmates. As it turns out, this young girl had lost loved ones in the quake, and was trying hard to earn a dance scholarship for herself. Others had equally impressive personalities and stories. I have many photographs with the children -- too many to post online -- but I will save them all because I wouldn’t be surprised if a future celebrity or leader was in that room. The children had the talent and drive, are gaining strength by overcoming an extreme amount of adversity, and have the unyielding support of a nation behind them.

After that, we took a tour of earthquake damaged neighborhoods in Beichuan county. The damage was extensive, as entire apartment complexes has collapsed or stood abandoned. Some small businesses continued to operate out of the ground floor of condemned buildings. In most cases the pictures must be allowed speak for themselves. However, it seems to be the intent of the Chinese to clean it all up as soon as possible. In a neighborhood decimated by the quake, a lone building of very modest size is slated to be preserved as a memorial to the quake victims. Industrial cranes litter the skyline nearby, clearing and rebuilding from the wreckage.

That night we had our only real outing, to a cramped nightclub in the heart of Chengdu. The next morning, our last stop before departing was a historical site, providing the only element of traditional tourism on this trip. We went to Wuhou Ci, a memorial to Zhuge Liang (181-234), a prime minister and military strategist who loyally served Liu Bei during the Three Kingdoms era. Liu Bei was also buried here, himself, in 223 AD. Zhuge has become a symbol of ideal wisdom and service in Chinese folklore, with the legend holding that he worked himself to death performing near magical feats in defense of his kingdom. He is usually depicted wearing a robe and holding a fan made of crane feathers. In addition to serving as a military strategist, he was also a profound statesman, diplomat, scholar and inventor. I found out that, in addition to myself, two others participants in the trip also idolize him as their Chinese hero. His shrine contains a large likeness of himself, as well as a separate chamber with likenesses of Liu Bei and his two top generals – Guan Yu and Zhang Fei – built in 1672.

We made our very final stop through a shopping district adjacent to the Wuhou Ci known as Jinli Street. Though recently constructed, it resembles a village of the Three Kingdoms era. You can sample Zhang Fei Beef, a local delicacy, buy crafts, or parse the other unique flavors. The most notable spectacle for me was that of professional ear cleaners performing their craft: hygienists removing wax from deep within their patients’ ears right on the street. We would have gone to see the pandas instead at the famous Giant Panda Breeding Center, but they were off limits due to fears during the swine flu episode.

Some airport football before a flight back to the Macau International Airport concluded our trip. Though our goals were humble and our time short, I found this to be one of the more meaningful Rotaract trips I’ve ever seen. The Rotaract club of Macau is a community-based Rotaract group, not a University-based one, so it has generally older and more professional members planning the excursions. And this one was extraordinarily well done. There was some reported early resistance to having foreigners attend by the Chinese authorities, but I am glad that they were overcome and hope that they feel the same way.

The children of Sichuan should grow up knowing that they are not just beloved by the people of China, but by all the world. Though our effort was small, I know they enjoyed the pleasant distraction and humble gifts. They, in turn, remind us what challenges the human spirit can overcome when it has to, and how to find joy in the most tragic of circumstances. I won’t be the slightest bit surprised when the children we so briefly entertained become the future leaders of China.

Parsing the Coconut Tree's Shadow: Lǜdǎo Xiǎoyèqǔ, The Green Island Serenade

2009-05-02T22:40:00.044+08:00

Parsing the Coconut Tree's Shadow: Lǜdǎo Xiǎoyèqǔ, The Green Island Serenade

The classic 1961 version of the Taiwanese song sung by Zi Wei (紫薇).

这绿岛像一只船在月夜里摇啊摇

zhè lǜ dǎo xiàng yì zhī chuán zài yuè yè lǐ yáo ya yáo

This green island is like a boat meandering through the moonlight

姑娘呀你也在我的心海里飘啊飘

gū niang yo, nǐ yě zài wǒ de xīn hǎi lǐ piāo ya piāo

Darling, you are floating in the ocean of my heart

让我的歌声随那微风吹开了你的窗帘

ràng wǒ de gē shēng suí nà wēi fēng chuī kāi le nǐ de chuāng lián

Let the melody of my song follow the breeze and blow through your curtains

让我的衷情随那流水不断地向你倾诉

ràng wǒ de zhōng qíng suí nà liú shuǐ bú duàn de xiàng nǐ qīng sù

Let my love go with the flowing water, serenading you

椰子树的长影掩不住我的情意

yē zi shù de cháng yǐng yǎn bú zhù wǒ de qíng yì

The coconut tree's long shadow cannot hide my gentle love

明媚的月光更照亮了我的心

míng mèi de yuè guāng gèng zhào liàng le wǒ de xīn

The clear bright moonlight brightens my heart

这绿岛的夜已经这样沉静

zhè lǜ dǎo de yè yǐ jīngzhè yàng chén jìng

This green island night appears so peaceful

姑娘哟你为什么还是默默不语

gū niáng yo, nǐ wèishénme hái shì mò mò wú yǔ

My Darling, why are you still silent?

---------------

I. INTRODUCTION

The Green Island Serenade is a standard Chinese love song that has been caught in a decades long dispute over authorship and broader Taiwanese politics. I was introduced to the song, and the dispute, when I attended a Vienna Teng concert in 2006. Ms. Teng closed the night with an encore she described as a Taiwanese folk song and lullabye. My Mandarin instructor, who was also in the attendance that night, informed me that “Lǜdǎo Xiǎoyèqǔ” (绿岛小夜曲) has political overtones, containing meaning for opponents of Chiang Kai-shek’s Taiwanese dictatorship. There and then I became interested in unraveling the song's riddles. Unfortunately, the lack of sources was frustrating. The few English-language footnotes available online tend to dismiss this claim as rumor. But most rumors contain at least an ounce of truth, and so I made it a side-point to pursue the meaning of this Chinese standard while in Asia. This modest post is the culmination, thus far, of that indulgence.

Indeed, two camps have competing claims to have written the popular song: the first claims it was written as a movie theme, the second asserts it began as a love letter between inmates incarcerated as political prisoners. The author of this post has attempted to parse the relevant history, translate the Chinese language material and incorporate the local folklore gathered on-site to develop the two stories in their historical and political context. I hope to expand this work with references to unabashed Taiwanese protest songs of the era and, in time, include a complete comparative review against songs and methods of folk-performative rebellion in mainland China. In the end, the true meaning of this particular song may never be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. To the casual listener, especially as generations pass, Lǜdǎo Xiǎoyèqǔ will be but a love song, but to those who suffered under Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang regime the song will remain an anthem of protest and pride, recalling one of the darkest chapters of the Cold War.

II. TAIWAN AND THE GREEN ISLAND

A brief and focused review of the relevant Taiwanese history is necessary to provide a context for the dispute over the song.

Taiwan was ceded to Japan under military duress in 1895. As Japan’s first overseas colony, the Imperial Government intended to prove to the world that it, too, was a first-rate colonial power. They poured money into building railroads, roads, hospitals, sewers and schools. Perhaps more significant than that, however, was that a generation of Taiwanese youth were subjected to an intense assimilation program known as kominka. It was a Japanese attempt to use the education system to replace Chinese linguistic and cultural norms with their Japanese counterparts. In effect, the Japanese had a reasonable amount of success assimilating a generation of Taiwanese into ideal Japanese citizens. The highest honor that many of those young Taiwanese could have, or so they were convinced, was to join the Japanese military. Many did; a few even engaged in war with their cousins in mainland China. As that war was winding down in 1945, the signatories of the Potsdam Declaration reassigned Taiwan to China: its historic hegemon. The foundation for conflict should have been apparent.

In the mid-1940’s, Chiang Kai-shek’s moribund Kuomintang regime began a retreat to the island of Taiwan, having lost the Chinese Civil War. (For a Pulitzer Prize winning account of how that happened, I strongly suggest Barbara Tuchman’s Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-1945). What they encountered, and trampled, was an island full of people in various states of political disillusionment. Many of them still considered themselves to be Japanese; others were thrilled about the idea of returning to Chinese sovereignty. Of the latter, several were greatly disappointed at the sight of the arriving gang of KMT soldier-refugees carrying their personal belongings in shoulder-pole slings.[1] Either way, many islanders came to understand that they had a unique dignity, ultimately considering themselves as something independent of “Chinese.” That identity crisis still divides the pan-Chinese world today, but in Taiwan, 1947, it boiled over into riots and, ultimately, four decades of authoritarian rule.

Several acts made the islanders frustrated with Kuomintang rule from the beginning. First, the Taiwanese people had hoped to finally become first-class citizens after 50-years of Japanese rule, but the Kuomintang’s Administrative Office excluded the locals from government posts. Second, as in many Mainland cities, the Nationalist “restoration” degenerated into plunder so severe that it resulted in a collapse of public services. Furthermore, the KMT Monopoly Bureau seized and grossly mismanaged the local economy. Commodities were confiscated and many private factories were absorbed into state-owned companies. As a result, the common people lost their means of livelihood. By just 1946, severe inflation and unemployment strangled the Taiwanese economy. Finally, the Japanese language was completely outlawed, rendering many of the Taiwanese officially speechless.

The resentment finally spilled over on February 28, 1947, when a native tobacco vendor refused to submit to the jurisdiction of a Monopoly Bureau officer. A crowd gathered. The officer fired his gun, recklessly killing an innocent bystander. The locals took revenge by smashing the nearby stores and offices of mainland emigrants. On the second day, they paraded to the Administrative Office and were mowed down by official gunfire. By March 8th, KMT regular army troops had suppressed the uprising. Incoming waves of Chinese soldiers, convinced of a much larger uprising, began indiscriminately shooting civilians upon disembarking. They would ruthlessly pursue anyone connected to the “228 Incident” in the months and years to come.

Throughout the 1950’s, the Nationalist Government sent its military, police and security agents throughout the far reaches of Taiwan in an effort to “exterminate bandits.” Anyone suspected of opposing Chiang Kai-shek or the KMT were rounded up and evacuated, with mass arrests of students, teachers and intellectuals. This era has become known as the “White Terror,” when the official policy was “better to kill one by mistake than to let one go in error.” Fear reigned as people slept uneasily, afraid of a mid-night knock on the door that would perhaps take them to an unknown fate. John King Fairbank, the great authority on China, estimated that 1% of the island’s native population was slaughtered in the chaos. Many of those who were rounded up were huddled onto ships. Beginning in 1951, untold thousands of political prisoners began arriving at the Green Island, a remote island outpost 33 kilometers off the coast of Taitung.

The “Green Island Lodge” (LǜDǎo Shānzhuāng) setup on the Northeastern corner was sprawling. One camp held nearly 2,000 people divided into 12 companies comprising about 150 individuals, each of whom had a sleeping space 60 centimeters wide. Men and women were separated. Daily political indoctrination was supplemented by a hard labor regimen of smashing rocks, cutting wood, building sheds, making rope and blacksmithing. Once done, the prisoners could prepare their own meals from vegetables and livestock raised by their own hands. As many of the prisoners were intellectuals, writing music and literature consumed the few off-hours, but those precious moments added up into volumes. Some prisoners subsisted there for over twenty-five years before being released, while others were sent back to Taiwan for execution. The ferries continued until that dark and stormy April day in 1975 when Chiang Kai-shek died, but the end of Kuomintang authoritarianism would not take place for another seventeen years.

The whole of Taiwan was a prison during that span, where any single word or aspersion could condemn a person to death. It many ways it mirrored the Cultural Revolution on the mainland, but on a proportionately smaller scale. The poet Tu Pan Fang-ko summed up the era in his 1967 work, “Sound”:

I don’t know when it was
That that tiny little voice that only the self could hear
was stubbornly locked away.
From that time on
Language had lost its exit route.

Could this possibly be an echo of the final verse of Lǜdǎo Xiǎoyèqǔ, whose haunting final line asked years before, “My darling, why do you remain silent?”

III. SEARCHING

Unfortunately, there isn’t much online English language material on the “Green Island,” and most of what does exist isn’t about the song. Indeed, it’s mostly travel-blogs maintained by ex-pats, often venting their frustration that the island is being transformed from their private little secret into a fashionable resort.

I first sought the complete lyrics of the song. I was excited to discover a three-verse version full of entendre, but learned that the later verses were added in 1995 by a Taiwanese pop star named Zheng Zhi-hua. Thus, their inclusion in this endnote is just to be thorough.[i]

Second, I retranslated the lyrics for myself, hoping to uncover some hidden metaphor or double-entendre. The Oxford Chinese-English Dictionary yielded some interesting initial results. For example, the word “rang” which means, “to let, or allow,” has an alternative meaning that implies urgency or need, and “ye” can refer to inclinations or leanings, especially “leftist” ones. No sooner did I show my textual analysis to a Chinese native than I was severely scolded for the effort. “You simply can’t do that,” I was told, “because we never use those words in those manners.”

Third, I sought people familiar with the song. I began with my peers, graduate students living at the University of Hong Kong. I found several who knew it well. Xiaolei, a social work student from rural Anhui province, could play it on her guitar. Yuhang, a computer guy from Xi’an, claims that his father used the song to propose to his mother. I was immediately surprised that a Taiwanese folk song had such an impact across mainland China during the Cold War, but came to understand that that is attributable to the ubiquitous Deng Lijun (aka Teresa Teng).

My host Rotary Club provided mixed reviews, but the perfect opportunity. Many Hong Kong Rotarians have maintained decades of business relations with their Taiwanese counterparts, as both were part of the same ex-China Rotary district for decades. Several members of my host club were all too willing to confirm, “yes, the song is (or may be) about the White Terror period,” but no sooner did one finish than his wife would say, “trust me, it’s only a love song.” Fearing a confusing battle of the sexes, I was happy to discover that my hosts have a sister-club in Kaohsiung. Kaohsiung is Taiwan’s second city, a major port in the deep South that also serves as the seat of political opposition to the Kuomintang party, both in the 1950’s and today. It was the obvious place to go next. I left for Kaohsiung in June 2008, intent to tour Taiwan and get to the Green Island. What I learned from the local Rotarians, including a lawyer who works for former opposition President Chen Shui-bien, proved infinitely more valuable.

Finally, I had great friends who helped me with Chinese language internet research all along, without whom this wordy article wouldn’t be possible. What emerged from all of these efforts are two completely different stories: the Green Island Serenade as both a love song and an anthem of resistance.

IV. THE LOVE SONG LEGEND

Most records assign authorship to the team of Zhou Lanping and Pan Ying Jie.

Zhou Lanping (1924 – 1971) was born in Hunan Province in mainland China and joined a music cadre in Chongqing during the Japanese War. He later graduated from the Shanghai Music Conservatory and, like many other intellectuals, fled to Taiwan in 1949. While there, he composed pop songs and movie soundtracks, becoming one of the most influential composers of the era. His most famous song was “Lǜdǎo”, but others include “Gao Shan Qing,” (Love on the High Mountain), “Yue Guang Xiaoyequ,” (A Little Night Music [Mozart, anyone?]), and “Yun Jia Han Jia Lang” (I Want to Marry a Han boy). He died during an operation for peritonitis in 1971. Many people believe that if he hadn’t had died so young, the Mandopop music genre would have been completely reshaped in his image. Upon his death, Pan Ying Jie, his partner on Lǜdǎo Xiǎoyèqǔ, penned an elegiac couplet that read, “when Zhou murmured the music to Lǜdǎo Xiǎoyèqǔ, he was missing his home on the other side of the mountain…”, likely referring to the Chinese mainland.

Less biographical information is available about Pan Ying Jie, except that he knew his partner well. Pan attended the same music school in Chongqing as Zhou, but was one year his senior. As he was the lyricist and the song aroused the suspicion of the Kuomintang security apparatus, Pan made no public statement about the meaning of the song for decades. In fact, he didn’t officially declare authorship until 2002, in the waning moments of his life.

Both men found work for the music department of the China Broadcasting Station in Taiwan, one of many outlets manipulated by the KMT for propaganda purposes. As the story goes, Zhou and Pan, after discussing the current state of Taiwanese Mandopop on a mid-summer night, decided to write a song that was at once poetic, beautiful, and meaningful. The following day, Pan reflected upon his feelings and understanding about life on Taiwan, wrote the lyrics and gave them to Zhou. Zhou, who was deeply infatuated with a girl at the time, felt the same way about his unrequited love, and immediately set the words to music. It was recorded at the China Broadcasting Station shortly thereafter, vocalized by the singer Zi Wei (born in Nanjing under the original name Hu Yiheng).

Zhou and Pan wished their song to be used in a movie, but it failed to make the cut. Nonetheless, a record company in the Philippines liked the song and distributed it locally. It became popular and spread to Malaya and Indonesia. A Malayan newspaper spread a rumor that the song was a love letter from a political prisoner to his girlfriend, making it more popular and sympathetic. Some Taiwanese dissidents appealing for an end of the Chiang regime even adopted it as their anthem. Not surprisingly, Zhou and Pan fell under the suspicion of security officials. They were interrogated several times, but never pronounced guilty of subversion or being anti-KMT.

In 1958, the Feng Ming Record Company in Taiwan learned about the song’s popularity overseas and traced the original recording by Zi Wei. In 1961, the Si Hai (4 Seas) Record Company had Zi Wei re-record the song and broadcasted it anew. By 1966 Zi Wei reached the height of her popularity, and Lǜdǎo Xiǎoyèqǔ spread across Asia. A future recording by the iconic Deng Lijun (Teresa Teng) sealed its immortality. But, shaken from their run-in with the authorities, Pan remained silent about the song for five decades while Zhou took any secrets to his grave.

V. THE RESISTANCE SONG LEGEND

That widespread rumor about the song being written by political prisoners on the Green Island is not unsubstantiated. Prior to being attributed to Zhou and Pan, many people believed the authors were Wang Bowen and Gao Yudang.

Gao Yudang (1924 - 2002) was a member of a native Taiwanese minority and grew up during the kominka era. He studied hard and earned admission to a medical school in Japan, and had practiced music from a very young age. He returned to Taiwan but could not assimilate well into the post-Japanese era, so he taught piano instead of practicing medicine. In 1950, he was arrested and sent to Green Island where he stayed until 1975.

This version of the epic states that the song was the text of a letter passed between Gao and his lover, Wang. The note was intercepted by a guard and sent to the warden’s office. Legend has it that because the poetic content was both sad and beautiful, but featured no clear resentment against the government, it was allowed to pass from Wang to Gao. He set it to music and it became popular among the prisoners. It spread from the prison to the island’s native population who sometimes had contact with the inmates, and from there made its way to Taiwan proper. Eventually, it found its way to Zhou Lanping who mass produced the song.

It is not difficult to find metaphors for the native Taiwanese struggle in the song. Security officials suspected that the line, “the green island looks like a boat, floating in the moonlight” was code for Taiwan’s political instability. The “boat” symbolized Taiwan, while “floating in the moonlight” described the vulnerability of the Kuomintang regime. As stated, the haunting final line asks, “My darling, why are you still silent,” possibly referring to the absence of political expression during the White Terror. If that was not the true intent of its authors, these lines and all those in-between were nevertheless commandeered by many Taiwanese dissidents who found in them metaphors for their plight.

In 2002 the mayor of Kaohsiung County, Yang Qiuxing, visited Gao Yudang on his deathbed. He promised Gao that he would help to find Wang and allow them to claim their rightful copyright. Unfortunately, Wang had died years before. Gao himself had suffered a stroke and was fading fast. His wife confirmed that he was the real composer of the music, and insisted that there should be no doubt given his musical skill and presence on the Green Island. There may not be much in the way of a legal claim there, but it is the type of story that legends are made of.

IV. CODA

Just days after that deathbed conversation with Gao took place, several media outlets reported an interview with Pan Ying Jie. Why he chose to finally speak forty-eight years after the song was recorded and thirty-one years after Zhou’s death is unclear, but he finally acknowledged at age 83 to the Guanghua Journal Monthly that he and Zhou were the true authors.

Pan claimed he derived his inspiration from his first views of Taipei, where he saw tall and beautiful palm trees for the first time. Prior to the Green Island being assigned that name (the Green Island itself was known as the “Fire-Scorched Island” until a KMT officer renamed it in 1949), “Green Island” was a popular nickname for all of Taiwan, so he used it. Finally, when asked if the song refers to the Green Island and the plight of its political prisoners, he replied quizzically, “do you see any palm trees on the Green Island?”

Unfortunately, I didn’t discover that particular gem on a Chinese web site until several weeks after my day on the Green Island. The pictures I took record abundant coconut palms surrounding the cross-strait pier in the city of Taitung, but not on the Green Island itself. (View the entire album here, http://picasaweb.google.co.uk/anewcitizen/Taiwan). However, there is an interesting plaque on the wall of the Green Island Lodge, which is slowly being transformed into a museum. It states, above pictures of the incarcerated, “Long palm tree shadows, never to be erased, home away from home.” Coincidence?

In the end, maybe it doesn't matter. Neither the palm trees, nor Zhou nor Gao nor Pan nor Wang nor Vienna nor Teresa Teng herself. Somewhere along the way, “The Green Island Serenade” became subjective. The truth was lost to history, but became the substance of legend. To the casual listener, especially as generations pass, Lǜdǎo Xiǎoyèqǔ will be but a love song. But, to those who suffered under the Kuomintang regime (and, perhaps, to their doting language students), the song will remain an anthem of protest and pride, recalling one of the darkest chapters of the Cold War.

I hope to expand this work with references to unabashed Taiwanese protest songs of the era and, in time, even do a bit of a comparative review against songs and methods of folk-performative rebellion in mainland China. The Taiwanese songs would be interesting when juxtaposed against protest songs of the Cultural Revolution. For a later example, see "血染的风采", or "The Blood-Colored Flag," which began as a patriotic pop song in the early 1980's and has since been commandeered for, or at least shared by, the Chinese pro-democracy movement.

In the meantime, I hope that you enjoyed this little indulgence.

----------------------

[1] These included a famous Taiwanese doctor and writer named Wu Xinrong who wrote about his feelings towards the first Chinese National Day celebration in Taiwan, “[a]t that moment, I felt so grateful that I could not help shedding tears. I did not expect that in my lifetime, Taiwan could be recovered and I could be a Chinese!”

[i] LYRICS

VERSE 2 (added in 1995 by Zheng Zhihua)

这绿岛像一只船在风雨里摇啊摇
This green island is like a boat, churning through rain and storms
姑娘呀明天的你会投向谁的怀抱
My Darling, who will you hug tomorrow?
让我的承诺托付梦中唤醒你迷惑的心
Let my promise fill your dreams, and arouse your confused heart
让我的青春燃烧一回照亮你前方的路
Let my youth burn and light your way forward
椰子树的长影掩住了说谎的眼
The long shadows of coconut trees have sealed lying eyes
暗淡的月光是非真假看不清
The truth can hardly be seen under the dim moonlight
这绿岛的夜已经不再沉静
This green island night has not been quiet
姑娘哟你为什么还是默默不语
My girl, why do you remain silent?

VERSE 3 (added in 1995 by Zheng Zhihua)

这绿岛像一只船在汪洋里摇啊摇
This green island is like a boat, swaying in the vast ocean　
姑娘呀倔强的你该怎么为你祈祷
My dear girl, how I should pray for a strong(stubborn) person like you?　
别让那战火冥冥注定改变了你的命运
Don’t let the war’s fire change your destiny　
别让那泪水模糊的眼改变了你的容颜
Don’t let those tearful eyes change your appearance　
椰子树的长影别掩住我的情意
Long coconut tree shadows, please do not seal my passion　
明媚的月光请照亮我的心
Shining moonlight, please lighten my heart　
这绿岛的夜是否能再次沉静
Will these green island nights ever be quiet again?　
姑娘哟你为什么还是默默不语
My Darling, why do you remain silent?

Guilin/Yangshuo Blog

2009-04-29T00:09:00.005+08:00

Apparently, everybody knows something I don't. Or, at least, something I didn't. I never really heard much about a small city with a funny name called Guilin. It almost doesn't sound Chinese on first hearing. But it's real and Chinese, at least marginally. The scenery seems unnatural and it's full to the brim of foreigners - hippie backpackers and yuppie tourist folk alike. Click here for the complete picture album of the trip.

Guilin (桂林) is situated in the northeast of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region on the west bank of the Li River. Literally, it translates to "forest of Sweet Osmanthus" because that's a common tree within the city, though it didn't acquire its present name until 1940. However, Guilin and Guangxi’s most famous natural attribute is its unique and kinda unreal scenery of limestone karst rock formations. Painters and poets have celebrated them for centuries. They rise from a coastal plane originating in the Gulf of Tonkin, when the whole region used to be underwater. They soar above orchards and rice patty fields; most are under 650 feet high but the tallest reach a maximum height of about 7,030 feet. Owing in part to this, the State Council named Guilin as a city where the protection of historical heritage and natural scenery would be an official priority. Most of Guilin’s old architecture was destroyed by Japanese bombing during World War II, but the landscape itself remains quite impressive. It is captured on the back of the 20RMB bill and has served as the layout of movies as diverse as Red Cliff, The Painted Veil, and Star Wars Episode III.

Guilin was first established around 315 BC as a small village settlement along the Li River, and the first emperor to unite China, Qin Shihuang, posted a garrison here as part of a Southern Expedition in 214 BC. Regular armies were stationed here to guard the Southern border, and they dug canals to transport food and supplies. The most notable of these canals is the Lingqu Canal which connects the Li and Xiang Rivers. Guilin prospered under the Tang and Song dynasties. The Ming made it a provincial capital and the last of the Ming Dynasty’s Emperors retreated here in the 17th century as the new Qing Dynasty rose to power. Guilin lost the capital status to Nanning in 1914, but remained an important strategic location, becoming a headquarters for the Northern Expeditionary Army led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in the 1920's. Refugees fled here in mass droves when the Japanese began invading China in the 1930’s. Guilin is still flooded by transients today, although they’re all now tourists who the locals call “hello-s.”

Guangxi has always been home to a number of China's diverse ethnic minorities. There are substantial populations of Zhuang, Yao, Hui, Miao and Dong there, but the Zhuang are the most populous (they constitute about 1/3 of the provincial population). There has always been conflict between the Han majority and these minorities. The Han only established their lock on Guangxi in the 19th century, at the same time that the British and French were dividing this region of China. Ethnically, evidence suggests that the Zhuang are the descendants of a Southeast Asian society from the Bronze Age. They retain their own version of Romanizing text, or Pinyin, which is different than the rest of Mainland China. Today, the city of Guilin boasts a total population of about 1.34 million in the metro area, 600K in the interior.

I went with seven graduate students from HKU. Ying and I went a day earlier than the rest, who still had classes. We went to Shenzhen and rode the train. The sleeper cars were comfortable, but the ride was 14 hours long. We check into the local, nameless hotel which charges 40RMB for a large room. When we get to the hotel the attendant says to Ying, “if we knew your friends were foreigners we would have charged 70RMB.” Luckily, I’ve now got command of good enough Chinese to interdict these racist efforts. I respond, “I don’t like what you just told my friend. I live in Hong Kong.” The original price would have stood anyway, but I felt righteous after making my point.

The first day was extremely rainy so I napped, then bought some hiking shoes for 120RMB (about US$20). After a dinner of spicy vegetables, pigeon, shrimp and the local LiQ beer, we went to a spa for all you can eat food, sauna, ping pong and foot massages. It was 38RMB for a 24-hour stay at the facilities, + 60 for a 1 hour foot massage. Four of the others arrive the following day at 8am and immediately we set out on a guided tour. It includes Elephant Hill (Xiangbi Shan), Seven Stars Park (Qixing Gongyuan), and the breathtaking Reed Flute Caves (Ludi Yan). That night we go to the market where I buy a few minority dolls (2 for 30RMB after bargaining; if you’re a foreigner they’ll ask you for 45RMB for one to start), eat dinner and end up at a bar playing a local dice game. The next day the final 2 arrive. We head for Yangshuo.

Nearby Guilin is the smaller city of Yangshuo which offers an even better view of unmolested scenery. You can get their by bus or by passenger-ship river cruise, which would take about four hours. We opted for bus, and took a briefer Li River cruise by bamboo raft once we got there. The boatman stopped at several small islands and riparian villages along the way where the locals offered food and trinkets for sale. The entire town of Yangshuo is a bustling commercial center including a perpetual night market, street musicians selling cheap copies of Chinese instruments, street food vendors (some sell grilled hot peppers which will give you hiccups) and many convertible restaurants-by-day-turned bars by night. The local foods of choice are Yangshuo noodles and “beer fish,” fish that have been battered in, well, beer. Watch the clock if you get a massage here because the masseuses are kind of lazy compared with those in the larger cities, perhaps because of the more transient cliente. Renting a bicycle is a great deal, however. It costs 5RMB (under US$1) per day, and the roads will lead to several small villages, some “model” socialist communities, and Moon Hill (Yueliang Shan) which offers a unique view of the countryside through a giant cheerio shaped rock. Most surprisingly, I’ve never seen a higher proportion of Caucasian people anywhere in China. While the major cities have greater numbers of expats, one could walk the streets during the day or night and feel as though they were in a European village, not a Chinese city. The secret, apparently, is long since out.

Chinese Constitutional Law Part IV.(D) and V.: Hu Jintao's "Harmonious Society" and Conclusion

2009-04-20T03:44:00.004+08:00

This is the seventh and final of a multi-part series on the development of Chinese constitutional law. The previous sections of this work are available here:

- Part I: Introduction.
- Part II: Great Constitutional Traditions of the World.
- Part III: The Constitutional Role of the Chinese Communist Party.
- Part IV: The Constitutional Place for Chinese Ideological Campaigns
A. "Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought"
B. "Deng Xiaoping Theory"
C. "Jiang Zemin and the 'Important Thought of the Three Represents' "

D. "Hu Jintao and the Harmonious Society" &

- Part V: Conclusion

--------------------

D. HU JINTAO’S EFFORTS TO BUILD THE HARMONIOUS SOCIETY: ADAPTING PARTY IDEOLOGY TO AN ADVANCING INDUSTRIAL STATE

Hu's rise to the presidency cemented China's transition of leadership from establishment Communists to younger, pragmatic technocrats. Hu came to power through the CCP bureaucracy, as Party Chief for Tibet and later Vice-President under Jiang Zemin. Thus far, the Hu administration has taken steps to advance the quality and accountability of CCP leadership. Like the other guiding principles before Scientific Development / Harmonious Society, this campaign is being built through trial and error, one ideological brick at a time.[1] It is very difficult to distinguish between the two concepts, but the CCP constitution does refer to them separately:

"Since the Sixteenth National Congress, the Central Committee of the Party has followed the guidance of Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thought of Three Represents and, by pooling the wisdom of the whole Party to meet new requirements of development, formulated the Scientific Outlook on Development, which puts people first and calls for comprehensive, balanced and sustainable development…It is an important guiding principle for China's economic and social development and a major strategic thought that must be upheld and applied in developing socialism with Chinese characteristics.[2]"

The Communist Party of China leads the people in building a harmonious socialist society. In accordance with the general requirements for democracy and the rule of law, equity and justice, honesty and fraternity, vigor and vitality, stability and order, and harmony between man and nature and the principle of all the people building and sharing a harmonious socialist society, the Party focuses its efforts on improving people's lives by solving the most specific problems of the utmost and immediate concern to the people and strives to create a situation in which all people do their best, find their proper places in society and live together in harmony.[3]

Hu and his Premier, Wen Jiabao, inherited a China wrought with social, political and environmental problems in 2003. They turned their attention to the wealth disparity between the rich and poor that was culminating to challenge the very premise of CCP leadership.[4] Hu perceived a need for a new ideology to shift the focus of the national agenda from "economic growth" to "social harmony."[5] Hu was especially keen because he – unlike the members of Jiang’s "Shanghai clique" – spent most of his career in China's poorer heartland.[6] He acted quickly to both address this issue and cement his own power by defining his ideological program early.[7] One expansion of the “Scientific Development / Harmonious Society” blueprint are the "five balanced aspects" (balancing urban and rural development, balancing development among regions, balancing economic and social development, balancing development of man and nature, and balancing domestic development and opening wider to the outside world). These were incorporated in pursuit of the “Green Olympics” program, where major corporations helped China develop a plan for developing renewable and recyclable applications that even Greenpeace recognized.[8] Another sign is the increasing use of the term “Xiaokang Society” in political discourse: a vision for transforming China into a society with a large middle-class.[9] Furthermore, there can be no doubt that this Chinese government is people-centered, given its heroic efforts to alleviate suffering during the unexpected blizzard and Wenchuan Earthquakes of 2008. Whereas Maoism was political in nature and Dengism was economic, “Huism” is humanistic.[10]

In addition to the economic divide, Hu has directed attention toward what is perceived as an increasing moral decay at all levels of Chinese society since the introduction of unbridled capitalism. Thus, he has outlined several programs to address moral behavior inside the CCP, the State and the general populace. Wen Jiabao has linked the Harmonious Society to the project of raising both the “governing ability” (zhizheng nengli) of the CCP and the ability of the government to carry out its public management and public service functions.[11] Hu’s pronouncements hark back to Confucian tenets about model leadership and the relationship between the governor and the governed. The revival of the “Two Musts” in relation to cadre accountability was expanded and applied to the general population of China through articulation of the “Fish-Water Connection” as a metaphor for the relationship between the Party and the populace. [12]

Then, Hu launched the "8 Honours and 8 Disgraces" campaign. This is an effort to promote a desirable moral code amongst both the general population and Party cadres simultaneously. Hu has called it the "new moral yardstick to measure the work, conduct and attitude of Communist Party officials."[13] It contains eight couplets of recommendations and restrictions:

"Love the country; do it no harm.
Serve the people; never betray them.
Follow science; discard superstition.
Be diligent; not indolent.
Be united, help each other; make no gains at other's expense.
Be honest and trustworthy; do not sacrifice ethics for profit.
Be disciplined and law-abiding; not chaotic and lawless.
Live plainly, work hard; do not wallow in luxuries and pleasures[14]. "

To the extent this holds cadres responsible, it builds on the Three Represents’ presumptive claxon for greater accountability. This reflects that the role of the Party has changed from a revolutionary party to a ruling party.[15] Hu and Wen have been serious about attacking corruption within the Party. In 2003 they waged an anticorruption campaign that prosecuted 13 provincial-level leaders. Wen claimed that nearly 37,800 government officials were disciplined in 2006.[16] The Eight Honors were given teeth by the February 2004 promulgation of the “Regulations of the Communist Party of China on Inner-Party Supervision” and the “Communist Party of China Regulations on Disciplinary Measures.”[17] A proposed “Law on Civil Servants” in would requires civil servants in leading positions to "take the blame and quit the leadership" if their faults cause "major losses or ill social repercussions.”[18] These programs are wildly popular, as local governments -- exercising a large degree of autonomy – have become little more than platforms for ambitious public servants to attempt social experimentation in the hope of promotion. China is a unitary state without strong federalism institutions, thus anti-corruption becomes the tool to sanction and reign in the lower levels of government. Unfortunately, Beijing's reach often isn't long enough to stop local governments from abusing the rights of ordinary citizens.[19]

The Scientific Development concept has also been extended to the recruitment of executive and bureaucratic talent.[20] Hu has made pronouncements that state China should establish a professional civil service apparatus, calling for a meritorious “selection and appointment mechanism that is open, competitive, and selective,” while Wen has called denounced seniority and nepotism in advancement. This builds on the State Civil Servant Provisional Regulations passed in 1993 that changed the way government officials were selected and promoted, requiring that they pass exams and yearly appraisals, and introduced a rotation system. Indeed, the more economic distribution of talent within the CCP has come partly in response to the enlarged scope of qualified personnel, which has gone from the party cadres of the past to “creators of value” and “outstanding management personnel [and] professional and technical workers.” Finally, there are signs of increasing transparency, as China's news agency is publishing many more details of Politburo Standing Committee meetings than had previously been available.[21]

Thus, we are witnessing a new turn in CCP ideological campaigns, designed once again to redefine the Party to face the new legitimacy challenges it confronts from a richer, more developed civil society. As TIME magazine noted in naming Hu Jintao its 2007 Man of the Year, “Far from wanting to weaken party control, Hu would like to reinforce it, to inspire officials to live up to the old ideals of serving the people."[22]

V. CONCLUSIONS

Prior to August 2008, the CCP was able to direct the national effort toward the outstanding Olympic Games efforts. But now the Olympic glow is gone. The CCP is once again naked and exposed to the everyday concerns of Chinese citizens. Unless a similarly important national project can be substituted, the CCP will someday find itself under intense social pressure. That day may happen tomorrow or in 20 years, its cause may be predictable or unforeseen, but it will come. The Chinese citizenry is richer and better educated than ever before and their expectations are higher, too. In 2000, the China’s entire over-25 population had an average 5.74 years of schooling; by 2020 over 100 million will have higher degrees.[23] At the same time, China’s economic development is far from complete. The average per capita GDP remains anemic due to low wages and a massive, though shrinking, peasant population. Given these extremes, the vast majority of the Chinese people have thus far accepted a social contract with their government that allows for few democratic freedoms in exchange for economic development. The economic development has come with a steep price: awareness. Awareness of the lack of democratic rights, endemic corruption, the huge and growing gap between rich and poor, the chronic unemployment and severe pollution. That may change if the CCP is unable to constantly adapt itself to bridge the divide between reasonable expectations and delivery.
Socially-conscious Party elements have noticed a deleterious effect on the social strata and perceive that economic development alone can not alone satisfy the Chinese spirit. Anti-corruption and addressing the administrative grievances of Chinese citizens is a massively popular project, but Hu and his successors must now begin to consider the next level of needs of the Chinese citizen: direct accountability of local administrators, access to information and freedom of speech. Perhaps the opening of the CCP to ever more classes within society begins to solve some of these problems. If the Party does achieve a maximum level of inclusiveness, it would take all points of view into consideration while avoiding the public rejection that occurred during the Hundred Flowers episode. By addressing these issues the CCP could redefine its legitimacy as the vanguard Party capable of mastering the issues of the 21st century.
In the meantime, Hu’s shift of focus to Chinese society has bought more time for “inner-party” democracy and rule of law to develop within the CCP itself. The anti-corruption campaigns have had great success but constant vigilance is needed. If the CCP can govern itself by rule of law then it may develop into a legitimate institution. Chinese ideological campaigns since the end of the Cultural Revolution have built piecemeal toward this goal. The recent Eight Honors and Eight Disgraces Campaign is the latest in a developing catalogue of governing principles. But, for long-term success, this new generation of ideology must govern the CCP as an institution, and not just the individuals within it. That is the difference between rule by man and rule by law. Whether, when and how the CCP institutionalizes these values is, apparently, anyone’s guess.[24] But, if the post-Cultural Revolution ideo-constitutional spirit of successive Chinese administrations is any sign, then it’s only a matter of time.

--------------
[1] It is difficult to distinguish the two based on pronouncements thus far, as proven generally by their usage by Fewsmith, Promoting the Scientific Development Concept, China Leadership Monitor, No.11.
[2] Constitution of the CCP, General Program, ¶8.
[3] Id., ¶18.
[4] Socio-economists have used a formula called the “Gini coefficient” to measure the income gap between urban and rural populations within a country for almost a century. The scale runs from 0-1, with 1 being extremely uneven. In 1991, China’s mark was 0.28. Today, China’s uneven 0.46 mark is almost identical to the United States’ 0.47. (Europe averages a 0.30). See Henry S. Rowen, When Will the Chinese People be Free?, p. 45; see also, Financial Times, Stirring in the Suburbs, Geoff Dyer, July 20, 2008.
[5] As the People’s Daily article points out: “At first glance, growth seems equal to development, but in fact [it] is not.” It goes on to say that if the nation were to focus exclusively on quantitative economic growth—while “ignoring the balance between development of the economy, politics and culture, and ignoring the balance between people and the natural world”—development would be imbalanced and ultimately would slow.
[6] Hu has maintained this rural linkage by taking a number of high profile trips to the poorer areas of China.
[7] The idea was first embraced by the Third Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee.
[8] See ''Green Olympics'' Success: Haier Plays a Major Role in Making Beijing 2008 ''Green,' Xinhua News Agency, Aug. 22, 2008, available at http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/green-olympics-success-haier-plays/story.aspx?guid=%7BF24D4A06-4521-4AA2-8203-8E205D112831%7D&dist=hppr
[9] See “UNDP supports China in building all-round Xiao Kang society,” available at http://www.undp.org.cn/
modules.php?op=modload &name=News&file=article&catid=14&topic=4&sid=100&mode=thread&order= 0&thold=0.
[10] The basis for building a Harmonious Society domestically is governed by the Scientific Development Concept. (科学发展观) is the current official guiding socio-economic ideology of the Communist Party of China incorporating sustainable development, social welfare, a person-centered society, increased democracy, and, ultimately, the creation of a Harmonious Society. It is the newest brand added to the idea of Socialism with Chinese characteristics ratified into the Communist Party of China's constitution at the 17th Party Congress in October 2007.
[11] Zeng Qinghong emphasized that the scientific development concept would entrench the three represents and would, if successfully implemented, result in social stability and harmony, quoted in Fewsmith, Promoting the Scientific Development Concept, China Leadership Monitor, No.11, at 3.
[12] In 2002, President Hu emphasized that the Party leadership must keep a humble attitude and a hardworking spirit, which are called two musts (wubi). In the speech, Hu linked the Three Represents to the hardworking attitude and the so-called fish-water connection between the Party cadres and the masses. See Jia Hepeng, The Three Represents Campaign: Reform the Party or Indoctrinate the Capitalists?, 24 CATO J. 112 (2004).
Hu Jintao has been careful to make that connection from almost the inception of the ba rong ba chi campaign. At a rally to celebrate the eighty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the CCP, Hu called on all Party members, especially cadres, to follow the good tradition of the Party, and the socialist moral concept of the ba rong ba chi:
“We should keep doing good deeds that benefit people, be always aware of the harm of greedy desires, keep disciplining our acts, self-consciously resist money worship, hedonism and out-and-out egoism.”
Liu Dan, Hu Jintao Calls on Party Members to Intensify Anti-Corruption Efforts, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, July 3, 2006, http://au.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t261034.htm. See also, Liu Dan, China Focuses: CPC Sets Moral Yardstick for Officials, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Apr. 4, 2006.
[14] The selection of the number eight was not accidental; the number eight (ba) is a homophone for fortune and has thus traditionally been associated with good fortune. The number four, on the other hand, is traditionally associated with death.
[15] Hu’s rhetoric about harmony and peace are the antithesis of Maoist phrases about class contradictions and anti-imperialist struggle. Great examples of this are the so-called,”Peaceful Rise” and “Three Harmonies.” For a discussion of the politics of Hu Jintao’s Three Harmonies, see Willy Lam, Hu Jintao’s Theory of the “Three Harmonies,” 6(1) CHINA BRIEF, Jan. 3, 2006, http://www.jamestown.org/ publications_details.php?volume_ id=415&issue_ id=3571&article_id=2370615 (“This ‘triple he [harmony]’ can be rendered as ‘seeking peace in the world, reconciliation with Taiwan, and harmony in Chinese society.’”). Lam suggested that the development of this supplement to the Sange Daibiao was Hu’s attempt to solidify his position within the CCP leadership and to distinguish himself from his reportedly more aloof predecessor by broadening the reach of the CCP’s ideological campaigns. Id. (“Hu is anxious to render the Hu-Wen team more appealing to the general populace.”).
[16] Among them, 4,058 were sacked and 3,236 were under prosecutors' investigation, “China to enhance chief official's accountability to curb graft,” XINHUA, Feb. 13, 2007, available at http://au.china-embassy.org/ eng/xw/t297195.htm.
[17] The regulations institutionalize several intraparty procedures, including voting quorums for major decisions (Article 13) and annual discipline inspections at all levels (Article 19). See Fewsmith, Promoting the Scientific Development Concept, China Leadership Monitor, No.11, at 4.
[18] “Official accountability System to be Stricter,” XINHUA, September 3, 2005, available at http://www.china embassy.org.nz/eng/xw/t186445.htm.
[19] Francis Fukayama, China’s Powerful Weakness, Los Angeles Times, April 28, 2008.
[20] Fewsmith, supra note 121, at 1.
[21] Operations within the Politburo and the CCDI still remain highly secretive.
[22] Orville Schell, TIME Magazine, Tuesday, Dec. 18, 2007, “Hu Jintao.”
[23] Henry S. Rowan, “When Will the Chinese People Be Free?,”Journal of Democracy, Vol. 18, July 2007, at 41.
[24] Many have tried to predict based on their particular factor of expertise when China’s political system will liberalize. Rowan predicts it will occur at a precise economic equation (id.), while Pei argues against him that political forecasting is difficult business and suggests that some unforeseen catastrophic event that rocks the Party must occur. See Minxin Pei, “How Will China Democratize?,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 18, Number 3, July 2007.

Chinese Constitutional Law Part IV.(C): Jiang Zemin and the 'Important Thought of the Three Represents'

2009-04-15T20:36:00.005+08:00

This is the sixth in a multi-part series on the development of Chinese constitutional law.

For this particular section I am greatly indebted to the previous scholarship of my mentor, Professor Larry Cata Backer. Because the extent to which this section relies on his insights is deep, I offer a meta-citation to his work "The Rule of Law, the Chinese Communist Party, and Ideological Campaigns: Sange Daibiao (the 'Three Represents'), Socialist Rule of Law, and Modern Chinese Constitutionalism."

The other sections of my ongoing work are available here:

- Part I: Introduction.

- Part II: Great Constitutional Traditions of the World.

- Part III: The Constitutional Role of the Chinese Communist Party.

- Part IV: The Constitutional Place for Chinese Ideological Campaigns

A. "Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought"

B. "Deng Xiaoping Theory"

C. "Jiang Zemin and the 'Important Thought of the Three Represents' "

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PART IV.(C):

JIANG ZEMIN AND THE “IMPORTANT THOUGHT OF THE THREE REPRESENTS”

Jiang Zemin’s contribution, “The important thought of the Three Represents,” expands on Deng Xiaoping Theory. It is the first ideology to achieve constitutional standing that does not directly invoke the name of its designer. Whereas “Deng Xiapoing Theory” and the others invoke entire personal legacies and force historians and jurists try to decipher exactly what they mean, the “Three Represents” is a quantifiable commodity. The formal statement of the theory is:

"Reviewing the course of struggle and the basic experience over the past 80 years and looking ahead to the arduous tasks and bright future in the new century, our Party should continue to stand in the forefront of the times and lead the people in marching toward victory. In a word, the Party must always represent the requirements of the development of China's advanced productive forces, the orientation of the development of China's advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the people in China." [1]

This commits the CCP, and thus China, to several objectives. First, the emphasis on the role of the CCP as the representative of the “advanced productive forces” reaffirms the commitment of Chinese constitutionalism to engagement and the economic reforms of the Deng Xiaoping. If the premise of the law and development school is correct, then the Three Represents would have been impossible without the rise of Deng Xiaoping and the institutionalization of his economic tenets. It also would have been impossible without the Tiananmen Square incident, which convinced the Party of the need to separate politics from economics.[2] Since then, the Party has steadily withdrawn from practicing a command-control economy, allowing the private sector to flourish.[3]

Second, it attempts to transform the Party into a more democratic institution by vastly expanding the class of persons included within the Party’s representation, i.e., “the advanced productive forces” (i.e., private entrepreneurs and emerging business elite). This formalized and expanded the Party’s growing inclusiveness by incorporating another class within, “the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people.” As stated, Mao legally classified everyone except workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and loyal intellectuals as "class enemies" whom the dictatorship of the proletariat would be turned against. The inclusion of the “advanced productive forces” came with a renewed campaign to provide more protection for private enterprise and property rights, which brought significant amendments to the CCP Constitution.[4] This broadening of the CCP also permits for more criticism from other corners of society while avoiding the rejectionism that occurred during the Hundred Flowers campaign. Thus, a compromise has been reached. The CCP offers an official place to the capitalist elements of Chinese society in return for allegiance to CCP norms, especially basic Leninist state organization.

Third, it continues the post-1978 pattern of parallel incorporation between the CCP constitution and the Chinese Constitution, suggesting a difference between Party and state and reconfirming the need for parallel development among the two. This proves that Chinese constitutionalism and any rule of law developments now proceed lock-step with the framework of the CCP, but that the two are theoretically independent. In recent years, the NPC has exercised greater autonomy, no longer passing laws in the unanimous fashion required by a Leninist institution.[5] The 1982 PRC Constitution attempts to divorce the political from the procedural. As a textual matter it embraces the procedural aspects of rule of law. The Preamble declares that the Constitution, “is the fundamental law of the state and has supreme legal authority.”[6] Article 5, as amended in 1999, states that “No law or administrative or local rules and regulations shall contravene the constitution. All state organs, the armed forces, all political parties and public organizations and all enterprises and undertakings must abide by the Constitution and the law. All acts in violation of the Constitution and the law must be investigated. No organization or individual may enjoy the privilege of being above the Constitution and the law.”[7] Thus, the Three Represents demonstrates a willingness by the CCP itself to embrace a mild level of accountability and dissent. In recent years, the National People’s Congress has been increasingly assertive, no longer approving CCP-advanced legislation by unanimous votes as a Leninist party must.[8] It has also been given teeth through the passing of subsidiary legislation seemingly designed to limit the discretion of both Party and state officials. It expanded the development of administrative litigation practice began under Deng Xiaoping. The 1982 Constitution set up a framework for the designation of administrative procedures, compensation, and the right to sue government representatives. Between 1982 and 1988, over 130 implementing laws and regulations were passed and the Supreme People's Court established an administrative law division. A new Administrative Procedure Law went into effect in 1990, followed by a State Compensation Law in 1994 and an Administrative Penalties Law in 1996.

Other evidence suggests that the Three Represents are intended to provide a methodology for moral accountability within the CCP. Jiang resurrected and reshaped positive elements of Mao Zedong Thought in order to facilitate reception and understanding of the Three Represents, as well as prove its place in the ideological orthodoxy. The “Two Musts” (wubi, that the CCP must keep a humble attitude and a hardworking spirit) was originally posited by Mao Zedong at the Seventh CCP Central Committee. Jiang resurrected it and stressed a relevant connection between the Two Musts and understanding of the Three Represents.[9] He relied on this in his efforts to strengthen and institutionalize behavioral expectations within the People’s Liberation Army and suggested its broader use as a theoretical framework to develop a system of administrative discipline.[10] This introduces a moral, not political, normative basis with which to assess the Party. [11]

Yet, the reception and legacy of the Three Represents has been cold both inside and outside the CCP. Conservatives view it as a rightist deviation that adds little to Deng Xiaoping Theory. Others dislike the focus on “advanced productive forces,” since this commitment to unbridled capitalism ignores the widening social gap between the rich and poor. There is vast agreement that the timing and unoriginality of Jiang Zemin's pronouncement was a self-serving legacy project. Unlike Marxism-Leninism and Deng Xiaoping Theory, there is little useful elaboration of it in the CCP constitution.[12] To his credit though, Jiang solved the problem of leadership succession typical within Leninist governments. He was the first party secretary in CCP history to voluntarily leave his post when his term ended. Hu Jintao's power succession was conducted in an orderly manner unprecedented in Communist China's history.[13] Though Hu and Jiang did not always see eye to eye, Hu has been careful to build his ideological legacy on the institutional foundations of his predecessors.

---------------------

[1] Jiang Zemin's speech at the 16th CPC Congress, November 2002.
[2] Backer, Larry, The Rule Of Law, The Chinese Communist Party, and Ideological Campaigns: Sange Daibiao (The “Three Represents”), Socialist Rule Of Law, and Modern Chinese Constitutionalism, Journal of Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2006, at 103-104.
[3] See generally Jinglian Wu, Understanding and Interpreting Chinese Economic Reform, Thompson, Chapter 4 (Reform of State-Owned Enterprises, p. 139-176) and Chapter 5 (Development of Nonstate Sectors, p. 177-216), 2005.
[4] Fourth Amendments to the PRC Constitution, approved on March 14, 2004, by the 10th NPC at its 2nd Session. Article 11 revised to: Revised to: "The State protects the lawful rights and interests of the non-public sectors of the economy such as the individual and private sectors of the economy. The State encourages, supports and guides the development of the non-public sectors of the economy and, in accordance with law, exercises supervision and control over the non-public sectors of the economy." Article 13 revised to: “Citizens' lawful private property is inviolable" and "The State, in accordance with law, protects the rights of citizens to private property and to its inheritance" and "The State may, in the public interest and in accordance with law, expropriate or requisition private property for its use and shall make compensation for the private property expropriated or requisitioned."
[5] Chow, C.K., The Legal System of the People’s Republic of China in a Nutshell, West, 2003, p. 180.
[6] Preamble to the PRC Constitution.
[7] Article 5, PRC Constitution.
[8] Tanner attributes this assertiveness to three factors: 1) penalties for speaking out against Party suggestions has diminished; 2) the NPC itself has become stocked full of retired Party elders who want to increase institutional capabilities; and 3) the growth of a professional law-making bureaucracy with increasing specialization. See Chow, supra note 96, at 180.
[9] Li Liang, Two Generations of Leadership in China: The Echo of History in their Paths to Power, PRESS INTERPRETER, Mar. 10, 2005.
[10] The People’s Liberation Army media was careful to work into ordinary stories these two campaigns in a related way. Liao Xilong, member of the Central Military Commission and director of the PLA General Logistics Department, stressed that:
“all the PLA officers and men, particularly medical workers and leading cadres, should earnestly learn from Comrade Li Suzhi to become more conscious in implementing the important thought of “Three Represents”, and should remember all the time the “Two Musts” requirements, and work hard with selfless devotedness and be brave in blazing new trails, so as to make greater contributions to the military logistics revolutions with Chinese characteristics and logistics preparedness for the military struggles.”
See Liu Zhengyun & Zhang Xiaodong, Liao Xilong meets with Li Suzhi's Advanced Deeds Reporting Team, PLA DAILY ONLINE, Nov. 11, 2004, available at http://english.pladaily.com.cn/site2/militarydatabase/2004-11/29/content_76904.htm.
[11] Backer, supra note 93, at 103, points out that this may be dangerous. The CCP committed itself publicly to embrace certain governance principles meant to provide certainty, predictability, and fairness to the relationships between the state and its citizens.
[12] Good luck discerning anything new from this, Constitution of the CCP, General Program, ¶6:
“After the Fourth Plenary Session of the Thirteenth Party Central Committee and in the practice of building socialism with Chinese characteristics, the Chinese Communists, with Comrade Jiang Zemin as their chief representative, acquired a deeper understanding of what socialism is, how to build it and what kind of party to build and how to build it, accumulated new valuable experience in running the Party and state and formed the important thought of Three Represents. The important thought of Three Represents is a continuation and development of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory; it reflects new requirements for the work of the Party and state arising from the developments and changes in China and other parts of the world today; it serves as a powerful theoretical weapon for strengthening and improving Party building and for promoting self-improvement and development of socialism in China; and it is the crystallized, collective wisdom of the Communist Party of China. It is a guiding ideology that the Party must uphold for a long time to come. Persistent implementation of the Three Represents is the foundation for building the Party, the cornerstone for its governance and the source of its strength.”
[13] An institutionalized power transfer mechanism is expected to emerge.

Chinese Constitutional Law, Part IV(B): Deng Xiaoping Thought and the 1978 and 1982 Chinese Constitutions

2009-04-01T17:35:00.006+08:00

This is part 5 in an ongoing series on Chinese constitutional law.

- Part I: Introduction.
- Part II: Great Constitutional Traditions of the World.
- Part III: The Constitutional Role of the Chinese Communist Party.
- Part IV: The Constitutional Place for Chinese Ideological Campaigns
A. "Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought"
B. "Deng Xiaoping Theory"

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IV.(B). Deng Xiaoping Thought and the 1978 and 1982 Chinese Constitutions

------------

...The answer lies in Mao’s duplicity. He is remembered as both the revolutionary hero and demented civil administrator. As the administrator he need not be praised, but as the father of the nation he cannot be dismissed. His first notable successor, Deng Xiaoping, was careful to navigate this dualism, paying homage to the revolutionary leader while dismantling his cult of personality.[1] Today, the CCP constitution refers to the achievements of Mao Zedong’s revolutionary tactics in the past tense:

"Under the guidance of Mao Zedong Thought, the Communist Party of China led the people of all ethnic groups in the country in their prolonged revolutionary struggle against imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism, winning victory in the new-democratic revolution and founding the People's Republic of China, a people's democratic dictatorship. After the founding of the People's Republic, it led them in carrying out socialist transformation successfully, completing the transition from New Democracy to socialism, establishing the basic system of socialism and developing socialism economically, politically and culturally."

Zhou Enlai and Mao both died in 1976, sparking an intense power struggle between Zhou’s pragmatic clique and the Maoist Gang of Four. In 1977, China entered a new era with the re-emergence and rise to power of Zhou's confidant, Deng Xiaoping. Deng had been living on the brink, censured by Mao and under house arrest; his son had become paralyzed under torture from the Maoist Red Guards; he had no interest in maintaining the absurd policies of the Cultural Revolution.[2] In 1978 a third, transitional Constitution was hastily adopted which restored many of the legal provisions contained in the 1954 Constitution.[3] The Ministry of Justice and Procuratorate were restored, as were the rights to defense and open trial.[4] More important than the Constitution itself were the various steps taken by the new leadership to rectify the excesses of the Cultural Revolution. Schools were reopened. A series of new laws designed to provide a stable base for a rational legal system were adopted, including a Criminal Code, a Criminal Code of Procedure, an Organic Law of People's Courts, and an Organic Law of People's Procuratorates. A major campaign was undertaken to publicize and explain the new laws, and legal publications began reappearing. Chinese students began heading abroad to study Western law. The stage was thus set for a ideo-constitutional Great Leap Forward.

After rationality began to set in, the fourth and current national constitution was adopted in 1982. It came 33 years after the defeat of the Kuomintang regime on the mainland and just six years after the end of the nightmarish Cultural Revolution. Thus, the 1982 Constitution was enacted under unique circumstances: drafted by a constituency of communist ideologues running from Marxist to Maoist and progressive technocrats desiring to embrace liberalization, with the septic wounds of foreign occupation, violent revolution and home-grown totalitarianism still festering. The success that China’s 1982 Constitution achieved in breaking away from these past events was neither too modest nor too great. Like the will of its drafters, it reflects many contradictions. It has at once both one foot in Marxism and the other in capitalism; one hand in civil liberties and the other in authoritarianism. It has been amended several times, but never repealed. Nonetheless, it manages to reflect Deng Xiaoping’s determination to lay an institutional foundation for social stability and economic modernization. Its prime directive for the nation, stated clearly in the preamble, is, “to concentrate effort on socialist modernization.”[5] He did not, however, believe the time had come for a Madisonian political system.

Deng’s ideological tip-toeing was very important in the early 1980s, when a schizophrenic Chinese Communist Party faced the dilemma of permitting economic reform without destroying its own legitimacy. Deng's success in jump-starting Chinese economic reform was largely due to his being able to justify those reforms within a Maoist framework. Thus, during his ascension in 1978, Deng announced Four Cardinal Principles which would presumptively guide the Communist Party and the state under his leadership. That dogmatic and conservative platform involved:

1. Keeping to the Socialist Road
2. Upholding the People’s Democratic Dictatorship
3. Upholding the Leadership of the Communist Party
4. Upholding Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought[6]

The extent to which these truly represent the ideological legacy of Deng Xiaoping is extremely debatable. They were pronounced in 1978, when Deng was still consolidating his power and testing the waters of change. They are not elaborated by the CCP Constitution.[7] The fact that Deng proposed this, then worked tirelessly to dismantle and free China from two of these concepts suggests the pragmatic spirit of Deng Xiaoping. Deng was willing to strike whatever rhetorical compromise was necessary in order to effect real change. No scholar should mistake of using the Four Cardinal Principles interchangeably with the legacy of, “Deng Xiaoping Theory.” That makes Deng Xiaoping Theory a very static, debatable concept. The CCP constitution describes it as:

"After the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Party Central Committee, the Chinese Communists, with Comrade Deng Xiaoping as their chief representative, analyzed their experience, both positive and negative, gained since the founding of the People's Republic, emancipated their minds, sought truth from facts, shifted the focus of the work of the whole Party onto economic development and carried out reform and opening to the outside world, ushering in a new era of development in the cause of socialism, gradually formulating the line, principles and policies concerning the building of socialism with Chinese characteristics and expounding the basic questions concerning the building, consolidation and development of socialism in China, and thus creating Deng Xiaoping Theory."

What is clear from history is that Deng dedicated his administration to undoing the excesses of proletarian dictatorship and Mao Zedong Theory. It is extremely unlikely that the present government of China still accepts Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought as their guiding policy, judging from the laws and amendments that have been enacted since 1978. The substance of the laws and practices that developed in pursuit of economic modernization was anything but Marxist. Deng ended class struggle and added constitutional protections for private enterprise and private property. [8] Furthermore, Deng Xiaoping struck at the heart of Maoism. He declared radical Maoism as a form of "left deviationism,” thus separated Mao from Maoism, stating his faults. Since 1981, the CCP has held that Maoism was necessary to break China free from its feudal past, but his administration was excessive. Once China reached a more sophisticated phase of economic and politics, Maoism had run its course. They promulgated the lengthy "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China," which reads in small part:

"Chief responsibility for the grave `Left' error of the `cultural revolution,' an error comprehensive in magnitude and protracted in duration, does indeed lie with Comrade Mao Zedong . . . . [and] far from making a correct analysis of many problems, he confused right and wrong and the people with the enemy. . . . Herein lies his tragedy."[9]

This statement provided an ideological justification for reclassifying Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, reinstating a market economy within the People’s Republic of China and forming a new governing ideology more tailored to the times. The two Cardinal Principles which Deng did appear to believe in, given an objective analysis of his administration, are the principles of adhering to socialism and following the rule of the Communist Party.

The principle of adhering to socialism states the form of economic base China shall have and develop; it is repeated in Article 1 of the Constitution, which states, “the socialist system is the basic system of the People’s Republic of China. Disruption of the socialist system by any organization or individual is prohibited.”[10] China has since pursued the building of a socialist-market economy. No one can honestly distinguish between a socialist-market and a capitalist-market economy in today’s world, and China is no exception.[11] Every major nation has built a market-oriented economy with some social welfare components, striking the best balance given local circumstances. The United States would never declare itself to be socialist, but there is little denying that it is given its broad array of social security, Medicare, Medicaid and miscellaneous welfare programs. The PRC may be comparatively far less socialist in fact given it lacks the means to provide such a comprehensive and redundant safety net. Indeed, the Chinese constitution is careful to state that, “The state establishes a sound social security system compatible with the level of economic development.”[12]

Finally, Deng believed in upholding the leadership of the Communist Party. The desire of the Chinese for a Leninist political party during the traumatic modernization process has already been discussed. Current opinion polls, taken in 2008, suggest that the majority of Chinese citizens are satisfied with the policies of their government.[13] In 2008, the government responded well to an unexpected blizzard, the Wenchuan Earthquake tragedy, and Olympic games. But one day the feeling of euphoria surrounding China will inevitably wear off. When that day comes, the people will turn to their government and expect accountability. The extent to which the Communist Party of China represents its people may determine its viability on that judgment day. Thus, Deng Xiaoping Theory made possible the opening of the CCP and the State to influences and elements beyond the narrowness of class struggle. That opening is reflected in both the expansion of potential Party members and in the broad identification of the CCP with progressive and socio-cultural elements. For instance, in 1980 Deng implemented the "Four Transformations" program, aimed to produce communist leaders who were "more revolutionary, younger, more knowledgeable, and more specialized."[14] Deng reestablished the judicial system, reopened the institutions of higher learning and sent students abroad to learn foreign law. His instruction to “gaige kaifang!”, or “open up and reform,” not only opened the economic system but also provided ideological cover for legal scholars to consider foreign legal models. It led to abandonment of Soviet transplants, continuation of the experimental approach to legal and economic reform, and the separation of public and private law, with greater emphasis on the latter.[15]

At the end of the day, Deng is best remembered for the results of his policies. These include restoring order, opening China to the outside world, the implementation of “one country, two systems,” progressive institutionalization and, above all else, reintroducing political pragmatism and economic development.

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[1] Mao was succeeded by his hand-picked successor, Hua Guofeng, from 1976-1980, technically. He brought the Cultural Revolution to an end and ousted the Gang of Four, but because of his insistence on continuing the Maoist line, he was outmaneuvered a few years later by Deng Xiaoping.
[2] Deng fell out of favor during the Cultural Revolution. He was forced to retire from all offices and sent to experience “reform through labor” in rural Jiangxi province. Later, Red Guards imprisoned Deng's son, Deng Pufang, tortured him and forced out of the window of a four-story building, making him a paraplegic. Deng Pufang has since made himself the chief advocate for handicap rights in China. Hu Jintao's father was also denounced during the Cultural Revolution.
[3] 1978 PRC Constitution, adopted at the 1st Meeting of the 5th National People's Congress on March 5, 1978.
[4] Rickett, supra note 61, at 109.
[5] Preamble to the 1982 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China.
[6] The central role of the Four Cardinal Principles is emphasized in the Constitution of the Communist Party of China: “[These] are the foundation on which\ to build our country. Throughout the course of socialist modernization we must adhere to the Four Cardinal Principles and combat bourgeois liberalization.”
[7] It says only: “[These] are the foundation on which\ to build our country. Throughout the course of socialist modernization we must adhere to the Four Cardinal Principles and combat bourgeois liberalization.”
[8] The 1982 Constitution originally stated that, “The State protects the right of citizens to own lawfully earned income, savings, houses and other lawful property.” As of 2004, it was amended to say, “Citizen’s lawful private property is inviolable.” The privatization of state-owned enterprises has accelerated dramatically in recent years.
[9] This official proclamation of the new CPC came in June 1981 at the Sixth Plenum of the Eleventh National Party Congress Central Committee.
[10] 1982 Constitution of the PRC, Article 1. When the CCP first came to power, this meant state ownership over the means of production. In the Deng era this radically transformed. The 1988 Constitutional amendments first acknowledged private ownership as a supplement to the state economy, the 1999 amendments gave private ownership equal status as state ownership, and the 2004 amendments made private ownership “inviolable.”
[11] See Lin, supra note 21, at 33.
[12] Article 7 Amended, Fourth Amendments, approved on March 14, 2004, by the 10th NPC at its 2nd Session.
[13] Jonathan Tepperman, Newsweek, Time of the Tough Guys, June 16, 2008.
[14] Wang Yanlai, China's Economic Development and Democratization: The Chinese Economy Series, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2003, at 95.
[15] Jianfu Chen's paper on Chinese legal reform during this era emphasizes the legal formulation of a "socialist market economy," inspired by Deng Xiaoping's "Southern Tour" in 1992. Chen, Jianfu. "Market Economy and the Internationalisation of Civil and Commercial Law in the People's Republic of China." In Law, Capitalism and Power in Asia, ed. Kanishka Jayasuriya, 69-94. London: Routledge, 1999.

Chinese Constitutionalism Part IV: The Constitutional Place for Chinese Ideological Campaigns, and "Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought."

2009-03-22T02:29:00.008+08:00

This is the forth part of a multi-entry series on Chinese Constitutional Law.

- Part I: Introduction.

- Part II: Great Constitutional Traditions of the World.

- Part III: The Constitutional Role of the Chinese Communist Party.

- Part IV: The Constitutional Place for Chinese Ideological Campaigns

A. "Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought"

B. "Deng Xiaoping Theory"

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IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PLACE FOR CHINESE IDEOLOGICAL CAMPAIGNS

Seemingly opaque and convoluted ideological campaigns are basic to political discourse in China. Many Western and Chinese observers tend to dismiss this as political sloganeering, but that simply can not be done in the Chinese context.[1] The substantive reforms that these movements have created are more powerful than the actual laws that have come to pass. Constitutional reference to ideology is made in the preamble of both the National and Party constitutions: Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the “important theory of Three Represents.”[2] They are likely to be joined by Hu Jintao’s “Harmonious Society” in the next decade as it has already been added to the CCP constitution, further reflecting the post-1978 parallelism between the two documents.

The first two references invoke memories of those inhuman perversions, the Stalinist Soviet Union and the Maoist Cultural Revolution. In both cases, ideological campaigns were used to confound the population and disguise factional infighting. Because of this disgraceful history few Westerners take the time to master the next themes – Deng Xiaoping Thought, Three Represents Theory and the Harmonious Society. Thus, substantive developments in Chinese constitutionalism go ignored, written-off as mere attempts to manipulate Chinese public opinion. Yet, the latter Chinese ideologies have had positive substantive effects. The inhumanity of the older theories in a laundry list does belittle the later ideologies which may prove to be resilient.[3] Discerning their relative values is made all that much harder by their apparent taxonomy. The older, morally questionable clauses share the common ideological plateau of “Thought.” Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin’s occupy the different tiers of “Theory” and “Important Thought.” Hu Jintao’s contribution is yet to be weighed and added to the national constitution; it is present but has no rank in the CCP constitution.

The CCP’s governing ideologies have real effect. They legitimized open class warfare and institutionalized the transition from a communist to a socialist-market economy. The newest contributions indicate a fundamental shift in the policy of the Chinese rulers. If true, these additions represent a substantial doctrinal development in the Chinese nation and Chinese constitutionalism.

A. MARXISM-LENINISM AND MAO ZEDONG THOUGHT,
THE 1954 AND 1975 CONSTITUTIONS

First in line but of questionable allegiance, Marxism-Leninism refers to the stream of communist ideology that emerged as the foundation of the Communist International during Stalin's era.[4] The name itself is a misnomer. Marxism refers to the theory and practice of proletarian revolution as conceived by Marx, and Leninism refers to its development by Lenin. By hyphenating both it is apparent that the two are not always in agreement, and communist theorists have indeed argued over what tenets should be included under this heading. They share a common belief in the necessity of a violent overthrow of an exploiting class by workers revolution, the need for a vanguard party to lead this effort, and the installation of a vanguard of the proletariat to facilitate the transition to the new order.

Marx’s humanistic materialism theory, discussed earlier, provided the goal: catapulting China to the forefront of nations.[5] However, Marxist dogma also demands that the great revolution had to begin in an advanced capitalist country and among the working-class proletariat, squashing peasant China’s revolutionary hopes. Lenin disagreed. In Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Lenin argued against Marx that a proletarian revolution would first occur in a lesser-developed country (namely Russia, but close enough to China),[6] because capitalist exploitation would provoke national self-determination in a peripheral country. Accordingly, the Chinese Communist Party used the decision-making procedure outlined by Lenin in his pamphlet “What is to be Done?” during the Chinese Revolution.[7]

After the Sino-Soviet split, the Soviet and Chinese Communists each claimed to be the legitimate intellectual heirs to Marxism-Leninism. Although there were always deep practical differences between the Soviet and Chinese methods of building a socialist society, Mao had rhetorically committed himself to the strand of Marxist-Leninist development honored by the Communist International, that of Stalin. Thus, when Nikita Khrushchev came to power and began to reform Soviet socialism and disassemble the Stalinist cult of personality, Mao declared him a heretic. By 1956, the split between as the different strategic goals of the USSR and PRC had become quite pronounced. Mao and his first-generation revolutionary cohorts declared themselves to be the true representatives of Marxist-Leninism. Thereafter, the phrase "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought" was used to describe official Chinese state ideology, making Beijing an autonomous center of doctrinal authority.[8] The Marxist dream of “monolithic international communism,” as it were, was dead.[9]

Maoism thus came to refer to the particular theory and practice of proletarian revolution, as developed by Mao and applied to the Chinese experience.[10] Unlike the earlier forms of Marxist-Leninism, Maoism begins with a clear military doctrine. It also differed by focusing on the rural countryside and not the urban landscape. Maoist military strategy requires guerrilla tactics focused on surrounding the cities with passionate and non-professional peasant armies recruited from the countryside. Once power is achieved, Maoism stresses rural development as opposed to the large-scale industrial development at the heart of Marxist-Leninism. Thus, Mao adapted Marx’s revolutionary strategy to a country in which most of the people were peasants. His principle ideological achievement was to build a Leninist party on a peasant base, not on the working-class.[11] Mao further honored the peasants by positing that a man’s class could be determined by his ideology, a bright peasant could improve himself through education and become a “proletarian.”[12] These theories have had broad appeal and several revolutionary parties around the world, particularly in Latin American and Asia, have followed this model to attain power.[13] Mao Zedong Thought was added to the CCP Constitution in 1945 and, though briefly removed, remains there today:

"Mao Zedong Thought is Marxism-Leninism applied and developed in China; it consists of a body of theoretical principles concerning the revolution and construction in China and a summary of experience therein, both of which have been proved correct by practice; and it represents the crystallized, collective wisdom of the Communist Party of China."

The revolutionary plan for freeing oppressed peoples from tyranny is the theoretical “good” to be distilled from Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong Thought. It is a modern blueprint for what the French population did in 1789. Unfortunately these goods were counterbalanced, indeed overwhelmed, by Mao’s catastrophic efforts at civil administration, all done with the color of constitutionalism. Mao Zedong once remarked how all major countries follow a similar pattern: after a successful revolution a fundamental law was promulgated to recognize that democracy had been established.[14] Thus seeking the brand of legitimacy, Mao established an interim course of action known as the Common Program in 1949.[15] The first formal PRC Constitution came in 1954. It was based heavily upon the Stalinist-Soviet model and its primary purpose was to legitimize the transformation to socialism.[16] It would prove to be the most promising attempt at building a semblance of rule of law in China for the next thirty years.[17] The 1954 Constitution included a laundry list of individual rights and the basis for an independent judiciary.[18] A professional Ministry of Justice was created,[19] as well as a Procuratorate charged with investigating and prosecuting serious crimes committed by state officials.[20] An "Organic Law of the People's Courts," also provided for the equal protection of the laws, the right to a public trial and the right to a professional defense for the accused.[21] And, during this initial period legal professionalism and rule of law did begin to sprout. Legal journals such as Zhengfa yenjiu discussed a broad variety of topics, examined Soviet precedents and indicated a growing professionalism within Chinese legal practice.[22]

This short-lived period of development came to a crashing halt in the late 1950’s. The failure of the Hundred Flowers Movement and the first five-year plan marked the beginning of a long spiral into the horrors of the Cultural Revolution.[23] In 1962 Liu Shaoqi criticized Mao’s so-called Great Leap Forward, which sought to rapidly industrialize the country but cost unknown millions of lives, as “30% the fault of nature, 70% of human error." In order to salvage his legacy, Mao sent China into a long descent toward chaos.

In these acts and the ones to follow, the legacy of Maoism was etched. Maoism turned to renewed class struggle to salvage his hold on power. This was facilitated in Chinese society by giving different legal status to different individuals under the Chinese constitution. The legal concept of “people” had circumstance-specific definitions in the revolutionary PRC that seem alien today.[24] First articulated in the 1949 Common Program, “people” included the working class, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and intellectuals.[25] According to Mao Zedong, all persons supporting the socialist movement belong to the category of the people, while all those objecting to it are the “enemies of the people” whose political and economic influence was to be neutralized in the new order.[26] The vehicle to accomplish this was proletarian dictatorship, a Marxist concept.[27] The “people” of China are meant to use democracy as the tool with which to form a dictatorship. That government would then serve to suppress the exploiting class.[28] Mao, invoking his god-like revolutionary status among the Army and the people, employed this tool and directed it to exterminate his critics. The horror reached obscene depths. Though the Ninth Party Congress declared an official end of the Cultural Revolution in 1969, it continued spasmodically until Mao’s death in September 1976.

In January 1975 the powerless National People’s Congress passed a new Constitution designed to legitimize the changes of the Cultural Revolution and formalize Maoist leadership.[29] That constitution declared China was no longer a, "people's democratic state," but rather a, "socialist state of the dictatorship of the proletariat." This Maoist thesis placed the government directly under the leadership of the CCP. The 1975 document also confirmed the elimination of the Procuratorate and Ministry of Justice, as well as the rights of the accused to a defense and an open trial, legitimizing the worst abuses of the period. Likewise, schools were closed and no professions developed during this era.[30] Mercifully, the document had a much shorter life than the actual Cultural Revolution.[31] The primary question is given this history, why does the Chinese leadership still invoke Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong Thought?[32]

----------------------

[1] A leading Chinese constitutional scholar insists that pronouncements of political ideology have no place in any constitution and that all of these themes should be expunged. See Lin, supra note 21, at 44.
[2] Preamble, 1982 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China.
[3] Of course, many morally and ideologically undesirable provisions existed within the United States Constitution – such as slavery and limited franchise – until they were amended out in 1870 and 1919. History records that evolution.
[4] It was named as the official state ideology of the Soviet Union by Stalin.
[5] As stated according to Marx’s theory of humanistic materialism, human societies progress through six stages of development: primitive communist society, slave society, feudal society, capitalism, socialism and communism. From the perspective of the Chinese leaders in 1949, China had an opportunity to skip ahead and proceed to a more advanced society by bypassing capitalism. To them, choosing to lead China toward a more primitive stage of development would be unforgivable. See Fairbank, supra note 19, at 278.
[6] See generally, Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, 1917.
[7] Lenin argued that the suffering proletariat masses could only achieve a successful revolution through the efforts of a vanguard party organization composed of full-time professional revolutionaries. The vanguard party itself would use “democratic centralism” to achieve its goals, wherein tactical and ideological decisions are made through an internal democratic process, but all party members would unanimously support and actively promote any decision once made.
[8] Fairbanks, supra note 19, at 424.
[9] Id.
[10] Constitution of the Communist Party of China, General Program, amended and adopted at the 17th CPC National Congress on Oct. 21, 2007.
[11] Fairbank, supra note 19, at 299.
[12] Id.
[13] Peruvian Maoists argued that Maoism was actually a more advanced stage of Marxism.
[14] See Mao Zedong Xuanji, Collection of Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 2, 1952, p. 729.
[15] See Lin, supra note 21, at 13. It was more of an aspirational statement than a constitution by any standard.
[16] Chow, C.K., The Legal System of the People’s Republic of China in a Nutshell, West, 2003, 72-74; see also Lin, supra note 21, at 13.
[17] Rickett, The New Constitution and China’s Emerging Legal System in Perspective, Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. 22, 1982.
[18] 1954 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China as quoted by Ricket, The New Constitution and China’s Emerging Legal System in Perspective, Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. 22, 1982.
[19] Id.
[20] Id.
[21] Id. In "adjudicating cases the people's courts shall apply the law equally to all citizens irrespective of their nationality, race, sex, occupation, social origin, religious belief, educational standard, property status, and length of residence." Meanwhile, legal journals such as Zhengfa yenjiu discussed a broad variety of topics, examined Soviet precedents and indicated a growing professionalism within Chinese legal practice.
[22] Id.
[23] Political dissent was stifled in the wake of the Hundred Flowers, where the Party requested non-Communists to voice their criticisms of the Party in order to improve governance, but received more and louder criticism than anticipated. Many intellectuals and jurists were declared "rightists" and censured, and the integrity of their fields was destroyed. This was endemic of growing interparty disagreements.
[24] In the early United States, “people” also had a limited meaning. The “three-fifths compromise,” embodied at Article 1, Section 2, Paragraph 3 of the U.S. Constitution, provided a perverse formula whereby the population of slaves could be counted for the apportionment of the members of Congress. Slaves, like “enemies of the people,” had no political rights.
[25] Preamble to the 1949 Common Program. By including the petty bourgeoisie into theory, the concept of “people” in China was broader than what Lenin advocated. But, there was little practical difference.
[26] Mao Zedong, Guanyu Zhengque Chuli Renmin Neibu Maodun de Wenti (On Dealing Properly With Conflicts Among the People), in Mao Zedong Xuanji (Selected Works of Mao Zedong), vol. 4, 1960, p. 1480.
[27] According to the Chinese scholar Xu Chongde, this concept has three prongs: first, to safeguard the state by oppressing the exploiting class; second, to consolidate the union between the proletariat and the exploited masses; and third, to establish a socialist society where class differences no longer exist.
[28] Preamble to the 1949 Common Program, supra note 69.
[29] Chow, C.K., The Legal System of the People’s Republic of China in a Nutshell, West, 2003, 72-74.
[30] Fairbank, supra note 19. The politically active were favored over the professionally trained: it was better to be “red” than to be educated.
[31] This Constitution was replaced by the 1978 PRC Constitution, adopted at the 1st Meeting of the 5th National People's Congress on March 5, 1978.
[32] The CCP constitution recasts the validity of Marxism-Leninism by stating:
Marxism-Leninism brings to light the laws governing the development of the history of human society. Its basic tenets are correct and have tremendous vitality. The highest ideal of communism pursued by the Chinese Communists can be realized only when the socialist society is fully developed and highly advanced. The development and improvement of the socialist system is a long historical process. So long as the Chinese Communists uphold the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism and follow the road suited to China's specific conditions and chosen by the Chinese people of their own accord, the socialist cause in China will be crowned with final victory.

Chinese Constitutionalism, Part III: The Constitutional Role of the CCP as a Governing Institution

2009-03-21T16:19:00.005+08:00

This is the third part of a multi-entry series on Chinese Constitutional Law.
This one is pretty short too, as it sets up the analysis of the following sections.

For Part 1, Introduction, please click here.
For part 2, Great Constitutional Traditions of the World, please click here.

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III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY AS A GOVERNING INSTITUTION

No analysis of the Chinese constitution or Chinese rule of law is possible without serious consideration of the institutional role of the Party. This perspective is not easy to attain because it challenges the fundamental tenets of Western political science. Ever since James Madison described political parties as “factions” in Federalist Paper No. 10,[2] Western political science has insisted that parties must be separated from the governmental apparatus at all times. If these two institutions become entangled or symbiotic, the nation’s leadership is fundamentally tyrannical and illegitimate – even if it practices benevolent governance.[3]

Lenin challenged this notion with his thesis for nation building. Both the Chinese Nationalists and Communists followed the model outlined by Lenin in his 1902 pamphlet “What is to be Done?”. Lenin argued that downtrodden masses of oppressed people could only achieve successful realization of their goals if an institutional vanguard was created to arouse and channel their collective energy. That vanguard party would use “democratic centralism,” or an interior democratic procedure, to make tactical and ideological decisions for the people. Once a decision had been reach internally, all members of the party would unanimously support and implement it. That model still more or less still guides the CCP leadership today.

It is important to keep in mind the distinction between politics and economics. Leninist parties do not necessarily have to follow a communist economic agenda (and what better example of this than the Kuomintang), just as a Madisonian Party does not have to pledge itself to capitalism. Deng Xiaoping attempted to merge a Leninist political model with a socialist-market economy, an ambitious project he distinguished as “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.” Therefore, it may be more useful to analyze the post-Mao CCP objectively under the socioeconomically neutral terminology of the “party in power,”[4] as Backer recommends, than to assign it a title fraught with misleading economic baggage.

Furthermore, the CCP is by no means alone in the exercise of installing ideological norms into their foundational documents; they are simply far more explicit than most other nations. As Backer points out, the United States has been very adept at implicitly incorporating its ideological and political campaigns into lasting constitutional language:

"The political ideology of Federalists, expressed forcefully in the Federalist Papers, has assumed iconic status in American jurisprudence. 'James Madison Thought' and 'Thomas Jefferson Thought' guide the deliberations of the Supreme Court, and the political branches to some extent as well, as surely as 'Marxist-Leninist Mao Zedong Thought' guides Chinese constitutionalism and limits the discretion of Chinese political leaders to effect change."[5]

No one can argue that every political party, Madisonian or Leninist, attempts to codify the core political principles it cherishes. Thus, the question of democratic legitimacy depends upon how inclusive that party is, especially in the Leninist context. The CCP claims to, and wishes to, serve as the legitimate institutional representative of the Chinese people. But critical observers argue that the CCP substitutes the personal desires of Party leaders for due process -- the equal and neutral application of laws to all individuals. Lacking fundamental institutional checks and balances, Western critics label the behavior of China's leaders as unconstrained and arbitrary. Professor Liu Jun-xiang points out that China accepts allocation of powers under the principle of sovereignty of the people rather than the principle of separation of powers.[6]

Because of the symbiosis between the CCP and the bureaucracy, the progression towards democracy and rule of law in China must focus on the CCP itself at this still early stage, not on the state apparatus under its control. For rule of law to find its way into the broader Chinese government, the CCP must first embrace the rule of law within its own governance. A growing ideological theme within the Party, which will be explored in the next section, is the need for personal accountability within the CCP.[7] This is in line with the Confucian tradition latent in Chinese society.[8] If a governance mechanism is adopted within the Party itself, rule of law may then branch outwards into the state mechanism which the CCP controls.

One day the blistering pace of economic development will cool. Signs are already emerging that industrial China will become a victim of its own success. As education and wages increase so do the demand for labor rights and environmental protections, all collaborating to funnel Chinese manufacturing jobs into lesser developed economies. The disproportionate economic growth between the Chinese coastal regions and interior hinterland has already caused many Chinese to become restless and question the moral premise of Communist rule. When those economic pressures reach a boiling point and judgment day arrives, the Party will need a renewed justification for existence. As a matter of survival, it must by then complete the decades-old work of developing a sound ideological basis for governing China. The rule of law would be a particularly good foundation to base that argument upon, and Chinese leaders have begun gradually expounding and implanting the fundamental values of such a culture in their post-1978 ideological campaigns.

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[2] Federalist Paper No. 10: “By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse or passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community. Such factions do not represent the people as a sovereign body. Rather, they are the expression of individual will, albeit in collective form.”
[3] Id.
[4] Backer suggests this paradigm in his The Rule Of Law, The Chinese Communist Party, and Ideological Campaigns: Sange Daibiao (The “Three Represents”), Socialist Rule Of Law, and Modern Chinese Constitutionalism, Journal of Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2006. Some Chinese scholars have suggested that the CCP break with its Marxist-Leninist-Maoist past by changing its name to the Social Liberal or Social Democratic Party.
[5] Backer offers two examples, “the thoughts expressed in Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments and similar writings and Thomas Jefferson thought as expressed in writings such as the letter to the Danbury Baptist Association have played a definitive role in the development of the jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses.” See Id.
[6] Liu Jun-xiang (ed.), Chouxiang Xingzheng Xingwei de Sifa Shencha Yanjiu (Judicial Review of Abstract Administrative Act), China Procuratorial Press, 2005, pp. 13 - 24.
[7] A number of ideological pronouncements have recently addressed the increasing prospects for intraparty rule of law. These include Deng Xiaoping Theory, Jiang Zemin’s Three Represents and revival of the Two Musts, and Hu Jintao’s Fish-Water Connection and ba rong ba chi campaign.
[8] Fairbank, supra note 19, at 278. See Confucius, The Great Learning.

Article 23 and an Otherwise Usual Newsweek

2009-03-21T13:51:00.003+08:00

Macau recently passed an amendment to its Basic Law. That amendment is known as Article 23, and deals with "internal security." Beijing lauds it for an enhanced ability to fight organized crime and/or terrorism, while civil libertarians denounce it for being anti-subversion and threatening liberties. The law has many similarities to Hong Kong’s proposed version of Article 23 which was shelved indefinitely due to mass unpopularity in 2003. “The delivery of the anti-subversion law has been a longstanding promise to Beijing who wants the enactment of Article 23 here to place pressure on Hong Kong to do likewise,” said Macau Legislator Leong Heng Teng in the Macau Business Magazine.

There has been a lot of interesting commentary across the regional newspapers throughout the process about Macau's character. "Macau’s population...has low political awareness when compared to its neighbor. This makes the region an unlikely base of subversion and reactionary activity," according to Macau political activist Lei Kin Yon. “Macau is a very closed and conservative society, where there is no tolerance to criticism,” Lei said in an interview with Macau Closer. Furthermore, the less affluent Macau residents have a “high acceptance for the central government,” Macau political commentator Larry So man-yum said in the South China Morning Post. In agreeing with Leong and So, Lawmaker Pereira Coutinho said, “Macau will be used as an example [for Hong Kong] and will demonstrate there is no problem with the regulation.” Though worried that the law may affect tourism, "some Macau people are apathetic to the whole affair since some Macanese are also unable to enter Hong Kong. They believe the debt has been paid…" said Au Kam-san of the pro-democracy New Macau Association.

Article 23 is included in Chapter II of the Macau Basic Law (the enclave's functioning Constitution) entitled, "The Relationship Between the Central Authorities and the Macau S.A.R." It reads:

"Article 23: The Macao Special Administrative Region shall enact laws, on its own, to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People's Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with foreign political organisations or bodies."

Hong Kong’s Pan-democratic lawmakers decided to put that to the test last weekend by sending a group of 33 people to a forum discussing the new security law. Five members from the coalition of Democratic, Civic and League of Social Democratic politicians were denied entry, while 28 more moderate members were allowed to pass and meet with their Macanese counterparts. Macau’s Public Security Police Force Commissioner said that Macau reserves the right to deny entry to those who will violate the purpose of their intended visit and rather endanger social stability and the public order under this law. Last month, the dean of Hong Kong University’s law faculty was turned back at the Macau border last month when he arrived there to make an academic speech.

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Meanwhile, Taiwan wants to get into the casino business. The Kuomintang pushed through a bill legalizing casinos which may lead to the development of casinos on offshore islands. Rumor has it that Singapore wants in on the casino business, too, after studying Macau’s model. Not to be outdone by the Chinese military’s once-a-new-U.S.-administration South China Sea confrontation with the United States military, the KMT have also moved to challenge the Obama’s Administration early by pressing the U.S. to sell Taiwan more F-16 fighter jets. Diplomatic relations between the US and China soured last October over arms sales.

Beijing rejected a bid by Coca-Cola to purchase a Chinese juice manufacturer, Huiyuan, citing a negative impact to competition in the juice market. This illustrates that Beijing, too, will refuse to a allow foreign takeover of a “national brand.” The question just is, is this their overall policy, or retribution for other mainland companies’ harassed attempts to buy foreign firms. Most recently, Chinalco (a state-owned aluminum corporation) has been in an ongoing battle to invest in Rio Tinto, a massive Australian mining firm. If successful, China – the world’s largest user of iron ore – will secure an ongoing supply from the world’s largest producer of iron ore. The move has encountered significant political opposition in Australia.

Hong Kong’s MTR Corporation, which runs the local subway, is widely considered to be the best operation in the world. As such, it has just agreed to build a new line in Shenzhen, as well as construct a brand new subway system in Fujian. All are relatively local. In the past, the English have tried to get MTR Corp to commit to refurbishing the London Underground but with no success. With the next Summer Olympics in London, 2012, the English may try to sweeten the pot.

Nanjing Blog

2009-03-12T15:58:00.005+08:00

This is part 2 of 2 of last week's story, click here for part one.
For more pictures of Nanjing, click here.

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Today in Chinese history:

641 AD, Chinese Princess Wen Cheng goes to Tibet to marry the Tibetan ruler. This act becomes one of the key bases for China's claim to sovereignty over the region.

1972 AD, The UK and China agree to exchange ambassadors for the first time, even though Britain recognized the Beijing government 22 years before. The UK had been caught in the tricky position of protecting its Asian colonies (namely Hong Kong) from communist agression (thus recognizing the Beijing government immediately in 1949, though the USA did not), and maintaining a united Western alliance on the other.

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The train stops three times: Shaoshan, Shanghai, Suzhou. We sit across from a very tired-looking old woman. “Nin hao, waipo” I say, “hello, grandma.” She smiles. She’s from Shandong, and offers us a variety of very sweet sunflower seeds to munch on. About an hour later I get up to stretch, and a young boy half-way down the car mirrors my movements. BJ reads The Economist magazine, which is always two weeks out of date by the time it reaches him in Hong Kong. At Suzhou, a stewardess comes through selling gimmick items – a dry erase board, spinning tops, and placemat sized holograms of horses and elephants. A lot of passengers buy the dry erase boards.

Nanjing is the capital of Jiangsu Province, and the capital of China for most of its dynastic history. The sheer breadth of history in the city is enough to make one stand in awe. We arrive at midnight and, after dodging a slew of aggressive private taxi drivers and hotel salesmen, eat a bowl of cooked veggies and mystery meat at a curbside restaurant. A women sleeps in the dining room bundled up in a sleeping bag. A man offers us a nearby hotel as we eat, and I negotiate a price of 100 RMB ($13) for the night. I ask about hot water, but forget to ask about heat. It is a very cold night.

The next morning we buy buns for breakfast and eat them beside Xuanwu Lake. The lake is supposed to offer views of the city walls and mountains, but in the morning fog only skyscraper shadows are visible. Most of Nanjing’s tourist sites are in two clusters: a group in the South, and a group in the East. We decide to tackle the South first and ride the subway to Sanshan Street (Three Mountain Street) to find a new hotel. BJ is obsessed with finding some hostel in his travel guide, but I am not keen on hostels for their lack of privacy. Besides, I can find no-name local hotels for the same price. Luckily, I do. They ask for 128 RMB, but amend to 100 when we turn our backs to leave. This time I ask about water AND heat. They claim to have both, but it turns out the hot water was a lie.

First we walk around Fuzi Miao, a Confucian Temple along the Qinhuai River, which passes through in a thin canal channel. It was built in 1034 and was once, in old times, a famous meeting place for China’s finest concubines. For 1500 years it was the seat of Confucian studies in China. Today it is a relatively upscale shopping area with a nearby night market. An old civil examination school remains. Dragon and Emperor displays beautify the river, making for a lovely night scene.

Next we walk to the Museum of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. In 1851 China experienced a peasant uprising intent on overthrowing the moribund Qing Dynasty. Aided by the Imperilaist European powers, the Qing put down the Taiping Rebellion in 1864. Today, the 13 year Kingdom they established is lauded by the Communists for attempting to make China independent, even though its leaders were Christians. The museum is extensive and includes many interesting pieces, including some monuments praising European citizens who helped defend the Taiping.

After a lunch of fried green peppers and roasted duck meat, we go to Zhonghua Men, the Southern City Gate. It’s not so much a gate as a fortress, with several chambers to trap invading troops. It was built from 1368-86 under the command of the first Ming Emperor. The 12 meter tall, 33 km long city walls of Nanjing were famously successful in dissuading attackers. The bricks are held in place with a mixture of glutinous rice mortar, and there are four entrances. Chiang Kai-shek himself banged in the characters over the front door during a restoration. Finally, we visit the city’s Revolutionary Martyr’s Shrine, built on the site of a Nationalist execution ground for Communists during the 1930’s.

That night we intend to go out to Xinjiekou, a shopping district, but stop in an internet bar first. It’s much dirtier than the Hangzhou bar, and the kid next to me is coughing violently. I put up my hood. An hour of internet access costs us 2RMB ($0.25). I realize it’s NHL trade deadline day in the USA; a holiday for any hockey fan. I won’t be able to listen to it on NHL Radio along with my friend this year, the first time in half a decade. We leave at 10:30pm, but the Fuzi Miao area has already shut down. We find a restaurant and eat dumplings and ginger paste filled rice balls treats, but the latter don’t agree with BJ. He spits his out into the bowl. I scold him, “if you hadn’t spat it into your bowl, I could have eaten those.” We supplement that at another restaurant, and go home agreeing to wake up early.

We do, due to the cold. The manager turned off the heat in the middle of the night. After two nights in cold hotels, I recommend we pay the extra 49 RMB for a room at Seven Days, a great budget hotel chain in China I trust. For 149 RMB ($20) we get a huge room with hot air and large shower.

We head East to the Presidential Palace, a compound shared by many successive Chinese regimes. The Taiping Emperor stayed here, as was Sun Yat-Sen’s house and office, and Chiang Kai-shek’s offices, whose chair you can sit in. It's a lot of history in one stop.

Next we go to the Purple Mountain, one of the three mountains which form Nanjing’s natural skyline. There are three attractions here: the Tomb of the Ming Emperor (which, unfortunately, was closed for repairs), a Pagoda honoring the sacrifice of Nationalist troops against the Japanese, and the Mausoleum of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, the founder of Republican China. The last is the most commanding and moving. A series of steps lead up the mountain to his sarcophagus. Nationalist Chinese banners still are painted overhead, out of respect for the old leader. He used to be visible like Mao, but the casket was sealed improperly and he began to disintegrate. I wonder if his body is really inside the stone, or if the Nationalists took it with them to Taiwan when they fled, along with most of China’s other treasures. A local rumor says they did.

The taxi to the mountain cost 36 RMB, the public bus back cost 1. It passed several more attractions we didn’t have time for, including Song Meiling’s house (Madam Chiang Kai-shek) and the impressive Nanjing Museum, set imperially back from the main road. When we get back BJ wants to eat at another random restaurant included in his book, but I claim that spoils the fun of exploring. He retaliates by demanding we don’t eat any fast food. Proximity breeding a little contempt, we compromise for a random restaurant, and the food isn’t very good. By meal’s end, our brief battle of wills is reconciled.

We walk to Nanjing 1912, the local party district. It features about 12 bars, and we walk into every one. Ten of them are exactly alike. I suspect they are under the same ownership, since the interiors are alike and the young men outside really don’t seem to care which bar we enter, so long as we enter one. We settle for “Touch 2,” across from “Touch.” The music is loud and there is a small dance floor, but most people simply drink and play the dice game, or watch clothed girls dance on a main stage. We want to sit at a remote couch, but they insist we have a front-row seat. Eventually, we move ourselves. Tonight, we play the dice game for keeps. After a while, I begin to make eye contact with a pretty girl across the room. After a few minutes of sideways glances, she bravely glares at me. I excuse myself from BJ, he understands. My Chinese is better than her English, so we chat. She claims to be from Fujian, quite far away, and she has a friend with her, but she doesn’t speak any English at all. I would try to introduce her to BJ but for that. She and I go to dance for a few minutes, during which time BJ introduces himself to the friend. We return to translate. Unfortunately, it becomes all to clear that they are employees, albeit clandestine ones, when they begin to insist we buy expensive liquors. We refuse, so they insist on buckets of beer and chicken wing platters. I tell her, “listen, if you want to hang out, we’d like to hang out with you. But we’re not going to buy this stuff.” They leave. Shortly thereafter, we witness a couple of the bar girls pass out from drinking too much, and they are harshly dragged out of the club. The atmosphere being quite strange now, we walk home. BJ stops in for a McDonald’s burger, despite our earlier battlelines. I check the NHL trades online in the hotel lobby, and then pump up the heat for bed.

On our final day, after much needed hot showers, we eat beef noodles and dumplings for breakfast, then go to the Nanjing War Memorial. When Nanjing, the then-capital of China, fell to Japan in 1937, the invading troops sought to make an example out of the city. The Nationalist government requested that the civilians stay behind, unaware of the fate that would befall them. In the following weeks, 300,000 unarmed Chinese soldiers and civilians were mercilessly raped, butchered, skinned, burned and buried alive. It is one of the darkest, terrifying episodes in human history. And, unlike German responsibility for the Nazis, the Japanese deny these events ever occurred to this day and do not teach them to their school children. These facts deeply aggravate the Chinese, and the Nanjing Memorial includes Japanese translations on every exhibit. The compound is large and built over a mass grave site. Its exhibits include an indoor excavation site where tortured, wretched skeletons half buried in dirt protrude. Each is labeled with a number, and corresponding signs point to where nails have been driven into the shin bones or skull of the victims, many of which are small children and the elderly. Outside, several stone engravings tell of groups of Chinese who tried to flee across the Yangzi River, only to be slaughtered or buried alive by the Japanese Navy. Every stone ends with a line to the effect of, “We remember these events so that they may never happen again. Make China strong, revitalize the nation.” At this hallow memorial, China’s willingness to sacrifice democracy in the name of strength and security seems tangible. My Chinese teacher once told me that no event has shaped the Asian mind more than the Japanese occupation of World War II, and though I always believed her only now do I fully appreciate the breadth of what she meant.

Our final stop is a large bridge spanning the Yangzi River. After the Sino-Soviet split in 1960, the construction of this bridge gave the Chinese pride that they could successfully engineer large public works without Soviet assistance. Revolutionary Soviet-realist style statues crown the center of the span, which also offers a commanding view of Nanjing. A bus stops on the bridge to take us back to the train station.

On board is a young woman from Zhuhai, very close to Hong Kong. BJ will go on to Shanghai to meet another friend. I will remain in Nanjing until nightfall, then fly back to Shenzhen. After eating lunch and saying goodbye, I stop by to see the Drum Tower, a site where many imperial ceremonies were held in ancient days. In Xinjiekou I pick up “Duck Oil Cake” to bring a friend, but am unable to find it, even at the local Wal-Mart. Finally, I ride a bus the 20km to the airport South of town, passing by the massive city hall and a glorious view of downtown Nanjing, man-made skyline against the striking beauty of the three mountains.

When I arrive in Hong Kong, I am a little sad. All week I navigated by speaking in Putonghua, or Mandarin. I could read most of the signs on shops, written in simplified characters. Now back in the South, my cab driver asked me where to go in English. When he didn’t understand, I couldn’t explain it to him, because he only spoke the local Cantonese dialect. Traditional characters on the buildings are equally impenetrable to me. In a way, I felt at home in Nanjing, and now feel as though I am in a foreign country, though in the city-state I have lived in for the past two years.